Who Controls the Immigration Bureaucracy? The Relative Influence of the Three Branches Over Asylum Policy Implementation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6179799 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Maureen Stobb (0000-0003-2865-3815, Georgia Southern University, corresponding author), Banks Miller (0000-0002-7948-8947, The University of Texas at Dallas), Joshua B Kennedy (0000-0002-4886-2203, Georgia Southern University), Joshua Kennedy (0000-0002-9504-6356) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 235-246 |
| Publication date | 2023-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Politics Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1532-673X • E-ISSN: 1552-3373 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1532673x221135509 |
| OpenAlex | W4307884129 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 48 |
At the center of contentious debates concerning U.S. asylum policy are immigration judges, bureaucrats who decide life and death cases on a daily basis. Congress, the executive and the courts compete for influence over these key actors — administrative judges distinct from those examined in much of the bureaucratic control literature. They are hired, fired, promoted or demoted by executive officials; face congressional oversight; and must follow circuit law. We argue that, because of the fear of reversal, immigration judges will look most to the courts in the decision-making process. Our results support our theory. Examining over 900,000 immigration judges’ decisions, we find that, although IJs are influenced by a fear of pushback from the elected branches, the impact is conditional on circuit preferences. Our findings inform scholarly understanding of judicial behavior and bureaucratic accountability, and support the pursuit of judicial independence and due process in immigration courts
Accountability · Bureaucracy · Executive branch · Immigration · Immigration law · Immigration policy · Immigration reform · Judicial review · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Public Administration
Power without Persuasion
Setting the Agenda
The Politics of Presidential Appointments
Bending the Rules
Deliberate Discretion?
Delegating Powers
Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine
Who Controls the Bureaucracy?
Presidents and the Politics of Structure
Let Me Be a Refugee
With the Stroke of a Pen
Immigration Judges and U.S. Asylum Policy
Independence in Administrative Adjudications
The congressional-bureaucratic system
Congress, The Electoral Connection
Why Congressional Reforms Fail
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
Strategic Anticipation and the Hierarchy of Justice in U.S. District Courts
Adjudicating Executive Privilege
Law and Politics in Judicial Oversight of Federal Administrative Agencies
Policing the Administrative State
Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System
Multiple Principals and Oversight of Bureaucratic Policy-Making
Presidential directives in a resistant bureaucracy
The Dynamics of State and Local Contexts and Immigration Asylum Hearing Decisions
The Dynamics of Political-Bureaucratic Adaptation
The Appointments Dilemma
The Hierarchy of Justice
A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion
Influencing the Bureaucracy
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
The New Economics of Organization
The Labor of Judging
Do This! Do That!’ and Nothing Will Happen
Small‐Group Dynamics, Ideology, and Decision Making on the US Courts of Appeals
Leveling the Odds
The Study of Administration
Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance
The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation
Who Polices the Administrative State
Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |