Who Gets Blamed When Congress and the President Collide
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6182777 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ryan D Williamson (0000-0001-5235-0967, SPPAIS, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, corresponding author), James Sievert (0000-0002-7937-7024, Texas Tech University) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 81-102 |
| Publication date | 2024-01-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Congress & the Presidency (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0734-3469 • E-ISSN: 1944-1053 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/07343469.2024.2313019 |
| OpenAlex | W4391836127 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 35 |
Previous research suggests that vetoes can be politically costly for the president. To date, however, these inferences have been made based on either descriptive or aggregate-level data. While prior work demonstrates a correlation between vetoes and evaluations of the president, they have not explored how the public evaluates or responds to veto politics. We seek to address this gap through an original survey experiment that assesses how the public responds to the heightened interbranch conflict that surrounds a veto. Our results indicate that although a veto can cast the president in a negative light for some, there are conditions under which Congress' decision to pass legislation it knows the president would veto can backfire. Citizens who are informed that Congress provoked a veto and those who are more politically knowledgeable are more likely to blame Congress for the legislation's failure, even after controlling for partisanship and approval
Economics · Law and economics · Political science · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law, Rights, and Freedoms
Veto Bargaining
Veto Threats
A systems analysis of political life
Pivotal Politics
Congress as Public Enemy
Strategic Disagreement
Insecure Majorities
Public attitudes toward presidential veto powers
Nationalized Politics
The Contextual Determinants of Support for Unilateral Action
Presidents’ Vetoes and Audience Costs
Public Opinion Toward Presidential Power
Political Theater or Bargaining Failure
How Presidents Shape Their Party's Reputation and Prospects
The President's Effect on Partisan Attitudes
Congress, The Electoral Connection
Nationalization and the Incumbency Advantage
Presidential Vetoes and Congressional Response
Institutional and Individual Influences on the President's Veto
What Time Is It? The Use of Power in Four Different Types of Presidential Time
Presidential Vetoes in the Early Republic
Unilateral Powers, Public Opinion, and the Presidency
Toward a New Typology of Vetoes and Overrides
Veto Threat Bargaining with a Bicameral Congress
Models of Vetoes and Veto Bargaining
Polarizing Cues
The Politics of Blame
Mobilizing the Public Against the President
Veto Rhetoric and Legislative Riders
Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual? The Factors Shaping Public Support for Unilateral Action
Partisan Dynamics and the Volatility of Presidential Approval
Policymaking by the Executive
Whose Party is It
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |