Criteria for Attributing Predictive Responsibility in the Scientific Realism Debate
Deployment, Essentiality, Belief, Retention
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6190757 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Timothy D Lyons (Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis, corresponding author), Timothy Lyons (Department of Philosophy, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, Cavanaugh Hall, 333 425 University Boulelvard, Indianapolis, IN 46202 USA) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 138-152 |
| Publication date | 2009-06-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Human Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1210-3055 • E-ISSN: 1337-401X |
| Publisher | Walter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.2478/v10023-009-0029-5 |
| OpenAlex | W2044109487 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 13 |
Criteria for Attributing Predictive Responsibility in the Scientific Realism Debate: Deployment, Essentiality, Belief, Retention ... The most promising contemporary form of epistemic scientific realism is based on the following intuition: Belief should be directed, not toward theories as wholes, but toward particular theoretical constituents that are responsible for, or deployed in, key successes. While the debate on deployment realism is quite fresh, a significant degree of confusion has already entered into it. Here I identify five criteria that have sidetracked that debate. Setting these distractions aside, I endeavor to redirect the attention of both realists and non-realists to the fundamental intuition above. In more detail: I show that Stathis Psillos (1999) has offered an explicit criterion for picking out particular constituents, which, contrary to Kyle Stanford's (2006a) criticisms, neither assumes the truth of theories nor requires hindsight. I contend, however, that, in Psillos's case studies, Psillos has not successfully applied his explicit criterion. After clarifying the various alternative criteria at work (in those case studies and in a second line of criticism offered by Stanford), I argue that, irrespective of Stanford's criticisms, the explicit criterion Psillos does offer is not an acceptable one. Nonetheless, the deployment realist's fundamental intuition withstands all of these challenges. In closing, I point in a direction toward which I've elsewhere focused, suggesting that, despite the legitimacy and applicability of the deployment realist's intuition, the historical threat that prompted it remains
Aside · Confusion · Criticism · Epistemology · Hindsight bias · Intuition · Legitimacy · Political science · Realism · Sociology · Software deployment · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Quantum Mechanics and Applications · Social Psychology
Critical Scientific Realism
Exceeding Our Grasp
A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism
Scientific Realism
Preservative Realism and Its Discontents
No Refuge for Realism
A Confutation of Convergent Realism
Darwin's Pangenesis and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives
Scientific Realism and the Stratagema de Divide et Impera
The Advancement of Science
| Citations per year | 0.13 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2018 - 2018 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |