Scientific Realism and the Stratagema de Divide et Impera
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8397536 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Timothy D Lyons (Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 537-560 |
| Publication date | 2006-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axl021 |
| OpenAlex | W1963661792 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 33 |
| References cited | 7 |
In response to historical challenges, advocates of a sophisticated variant of scientific realism emphasize that theoretical systems can be divided into numerous constituents. Setting aside any epistemic commitment to the systems themselves, they maintain that we can justifiably believe those specific constituents that are deployed in key successful predictions. Stathis Psillos articulates an explicit criterion for discerning exactly which theoretical constituents qualify. I critique Psillos's criterion in detail. I then test the more general deployment realist intuition against a set of well-known historical cases, whose significance has, I contend, been overlooked. I conclude that this sophisticated form of realism remains threatened by the historical argument that prompted it. 1. A criterion for scientific realism 2. Assessing the criterion 3. A return to the crucial insight: responsibility 4. A few case studies 5. Assessing deployment realism
Argument (complex analysis) · Aside · Epistemology · Intuition · Realism · Scientific realism · Scientific theory · Sociology · Software deployment · Computer Science · History of Science and Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Science and Climate Studies
How Explanatory Reasoning Justifies Pursuit
Theoretical Virtues in Science
Resisting Scientific Realism
The Poetics of Physics
From Unobservable to Observable
Does Explaining Past Success Require (Enough) Retention? The Case of Ptolemaic Astronomy
An A Priori Refutation of the Classical Pessimistic Induction
Akaike and the No Miracle Argument for Scientific Realism
Naturalism and the success of science
Comparative success and empirical progress without approximate truth
Structural realism versus standard scientific realism
Epistemic selectivity, historical threats, and the non-epistemic tenets of scientific realism
A deductive variation on the no miracles argument
Understanding the selective realist defence against the PMI
Reconsidering the miracle argument on the supposition of transient underdetermination
Methodological realism and modal resourcefulness
Systematicity theory meets Socratic scientific realism
Scientific realism
Optimistic realism about scientific progress
Structural realism versus deployment realism
Realism on the rocks
Did Ptolemy make novel predictions? Launching Ptolemaic astronomy into the scientific realism debate
Scientific realism and empirical confirmation
Defending the selective confirmation strategy
Two arguments for scientific realism unified
A Confrontation of Convergent Realism
What Elements of Successful Scientific Theories Are the Correct Targets for “Selective” Scientific Realism
Against Selective Realism(s)
Scientific Realism and the Divide et Impera Strategy
Escaping the Fundamental Dichotomy of Scientific Realism
How to Split a Theory
When Empirical Success Implies Theoretical Reference
Criteria for Attributing Predictive Responsibility in the Scientific Realism Debate
| Unique citing works | 33 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1.94 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2025 (17) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 32 |