Jurors' use of naked statistical evidence

Exploring bases and implications of the Wells effect

Bibliographic Data

ID6201549
AuthorsKeith E Niedermeier (corresponding author), Norbert L Kerr (0000-0003-0115-0767), Lawrence A Messé
Year1999
Volume76
Issue4
Pages533-542
Publication date1999-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Personality and Social Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-3514 • E-ISSN: 1939-1315
PublisherAmerican Psychological Association (APA) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1037//0022-3514.76.4.533
OpenAlexW4250278178
LanguageEN
Citations received11

G. L. Wells (1992) demonstrated that jurors react differently to probabilistic evidence indicating that there is an 80% chance the defendant committed an act than they do to 80% reliable evidence indicating the defendant committed an act. Even though jurors report that the probability of guilt is approximately 80% for both forms, they are much more likely to find against the defendant in the latter than in the former case, a phenomenon the authors term the Wells effect. Three experiments explore a variety of possible explanations for the Wells effect. Results provided the most consistent support for an ease-of-simulation mechanism, which holds that jurors are more reluctant to convict when they can easily simulate a scenario in which the defendant is not guilty

Statistical analysis · Statistical evidence · Statistics · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis · Computational and Text Analysis Methods · Forecasting Techniques and Applications · Jury Decision Making Processes · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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