Legal proof and statistical conjunctions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21371006 |
|---|---|
| Authors | L Ro (0000-0001-9683-9924, London School of Economics and Political Science, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 178 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 2021-2041 |
| Publication date | 2021-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11098-020-01521-z |
| OpenAlex | W3080981080 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 34 |
A question, long discussed by legal scholars, has recently provoked a considerable amount of philosophical attention: ‘Is it ever appropriate to base a legal verdict on statistical evidence alone?’ Many philosophers who have considered this question reject legal reliance on bare statistics, even when the odds of error are extremely low. This paper develops a puzzle for the dominant theories concerning why we should eschew bare statistics. Namely, there seem to be compelling scenarios in which there are multiple sources of incriminating statistical evidence . As we conjoin together different types of statistical evidence, it becomes increasingly incredible to suppose that a positive verdict would be impermissible. I suggest that none of the dominant views in the literature can easily accommodate such cases, and close by offering a diagnosis of my own
Epistemology · Logistic regression · Metaphysics · Odds · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Political science · Statistical evidence · Statistics · Verdict · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Jury Decision Making Processes · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology
Knowledge and Lotteries
Probabilistic Knowledge
The Probable and The Provable
Knowledge and its Limits
Between Probability and Certainty
Belief, credence, and norms
Trial by Mathematics
What is inference?
Profile Evidence, Fairness, and the Risks of Mistaken Convictions
Statistical Evidence and Individual Litigants
DNA, Blue Bus, and phase changes
Legal Probabilism
The rational impermissibility of accepting (some) racial generalizations
The disvalue of knowledge
Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law
Rehabilitating Statistical Evidence
Naked statistical evidence of liability
Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge
The Reasonable and the Relevant
Jurors' use of naked statistical evidence
Explaining the evidence
Recent work on the proof paradox
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2023 (2) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |