The Reasonable and the Relevant

Legal Standards of Proof

Bibliographic Data

ID6326004
AuthorsGreg Gardiner (0000-0002-9343-5155, University of Tennessee at Knoxville, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume47
Issue3
Pages288-318
Publication date2019-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy & Public Affairs (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0048-3915 • E-ISSN: 1088-4963
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/papa.12149
OpenAlexW2983447677
LanguageEN
Citations received31
References cited17

According to a common conception of legal proof, satisfying a legal burden requires establishing a claim to a numerical threshold.Beyond reasonable doubt, for example, is often glossed as 90% or 95% likelihood given the evidence.Preponderance of evidence is interpreted as meaning at least 50% likelihood given the evidence.In light of problems with the common conception, I propose a new 'relevant alternatives' framework for legal standards of proof.Relevant alternative accounts of knowledge state that a person knows a proposition when their evidence rules out all relevant error possibilities.I adapt this framework to model three legal standards of proof-the preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and beyond reasonable doubt standards.I describe virtues of this framework.I argue that, by eschewing numerical thresholds, the relevant alternatives framework avoids problems inherent to rival models.I conclude by articulating aspects of legal normativity and practice illuminated by the relevant alternatives framework.Keywords.Legal standards of proof, relevant alternatives theory, proof paradox, beyond reasonable doubt, preponderance of evidence The Limits of BalanceA common conception holds that epistemic justification is a matter of probabilistic likelihood given the evidence.On this widely-held view, a claim is epistemically justified if it meets a threshold of probabilistic likelihood given the evidence; if, given a body of evidence, claim p is more likely than claim q, this means that p is more epistemically justified than q by that evidence. 1Against this background, theorists discuss the probabilistic threshold for the legal standard of proof 'beyond reasonable doubt'.Beyond reasonable doubt is the epistemic threshold required for criminal conviction in increasingly many legal systems, including most anglophone countries, Germany, Sweden, Italy, and Israel. 2 Theorists argue that-given the seriousness of criminal proceedings, the distinctive harms of false conviction, and the importance of public trust in the system-the relevant standard of proof must be a high threshold.Accordingly beyond reasonable doubt is often glossed as around 90% or 95% probability of guilt given the evidence.Debates rage about whether this figure is too low or high. 3 Theorists also debate whether the likelihood should be sensitive to practical stakes involved.Laudan argues, for instance, that high costs of false acquittal for violent crime means that the standard of proof governing conviction for violent crime should be lowered and suggests a threshold in the vicinity of 56% to 67%. 4 Others suggest that, given the high costs of false conviction, a standard of 90% or 95% likelihood is not sufficiently demanding.1

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