Do Political Finance Reforms Reduce Corruption
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6228222 |
|---|---|
| Authors | C Hummel (0000-0003-3673-0657, University of Miami, corresponding author), John Gerring (0000-0001-9858-2050, The University of Texas at Austin), Thomas Burt (The University of Texas at Austin) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 869-889 |
| Publication date | 2021-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-1234 • E-ISSN: 1469-2112 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0007123419000358 |
| OpenAlex | W2982519347 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 21 |
| References cited | 62 |
Reformers claim that public subsidies and regulation of political finance reduce corruption in politics, while observers worry that they have no impact on corruption, or even increase it. Despite national-level debates and billions of dollars spent, few studies have tested this relationship. The authors argue that political finance reform mitigates corruption by reducing private money's importance in politics and increasing the sanctions for corrupt behavior. Elite interviews from Paraguay's political finance reform illustrate the argument and elaborate the theoretical mechanisms. The study evaluates the argument using an original dataset measuring political subsidies from 175 countries from 1900–2015, as well as disaggregated corruption measures from the Varieties of Democracy project. The findings support the thesis that political finance reform reduces corruption, even in countries where such reforms are unevenly implemented
Argument (complex analysis · Campaign finance · Democracy · Economics · Elite · Language change · Political corruption · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sanctions · Subsidy · Corruption and Economic Development · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Finance · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law
Structural model of the application of anti-corruption values to local government bureaucrats
Political constraints, public party funding, and the regulation of political finance
Do political finance reforms really reduce corruption? A replication study
Blessing or curse? A critical review of the paradoxical consequences of direct public funding for political parties
Illicit gains and state capture
The limits of awards for anti‐corruption
Can financial transparency help parties institutionalize and save democracy
Model based clustering of political finance regimes
Innovative but feeble
Special Interest Trade-Offs
A grammar of institutions for complex legal topics
The worthy and the fallible
Draining the Swamp? Populist leadership and corruption
Rethinking public funding of parties and corruption
Political Corruption Cycles
Do Campaign Contribution Limits Curb the Influence of Money in Politics
Do Political Finance Reforms Reduce Corruption
Cleaning up Politics
How Do Electoral Outcomes Affect Campaign Contributions? The Role of Personal Loyalty and Investment Motives
How Do Government Integrity Policies Affect Corruption Risks in Political Parties? Evidence for Latin America
Electoral backsliding? Democratic divergence and trajectories in the quality of elections worldwide
Checkbook Elections?
What Do Corruption Indices Measure?
Corruption perceptions vs. corruption reality
Corruption in Developing Countries
Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models
The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay
Corruption and Growth
Corruption and Government
The causes of corruption
Money in the 2014 Congressional Elections
Checkbook elections
When crime pays
A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments
Are International Databases on Corruption Reliable? A Comparison of Expert Opinion Surveys and Household Surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa
Reducing bureaucratic corruption
Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence
Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House
The Elimination of Corrupt Practices in British Elections'? Reassessing the Impact of the 1883 Corrupt Practices Act
Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables
If Money Talks, What Does It Say? Varieties of Capitalism and Business Financing of Parties
Democracy and Economic Growth
State Campaign Finance Laws and Interest Group Electioneering Activities
Scandals and Congressional Elections in the Post-Watergate Era
Linking Knowledge and Action
Explaining Political Finance Reforms
The Problem with Party Finance
The Influence of Romanian Campaign Finance Laws on Party System Development and Corruption
Financing Politics
Does Money Matter? Credible Commitments and Campaign Finance in New Democracies
Competition by Denunciation
Insider or Outsider? Grand Corruption and Electoral Accountability
Political Finance in Comparative Perspective
What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research
Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent
Do Political Finance Reforms Reduce Corruption
An Informational Theory of Campaign Clientelism
Poor People's Politics
Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies
Explaining Senate Election Outcomes
The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections
Guerrilla Auditors
| Unique citing works | 21 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,2 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 21 |