Examining the Robustness of Ideological Voting
Evidence from the Confederate House of Representatives
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6230176 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J A Jenkins (0000-0001-7426-3370, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2000 |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 811 |
| Publication date | 2000-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2669283 |
| OpenAlex | W2066263234 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 32 |
| References cited | 31 |
A majority of work on Congressional voting behavior finds that members of Congress establish ideological positions and maintain them throughout the entirety of their careers, regardless of how their career aspirations, political positions, or underlying constituencies change. Based on this evidence, Poole (1998) concludes that members of Congress die in their ideological boots. I examine the robustness of the thesis more closely, using vote-scaling techniques and roll-call voting data from a different American legislative system: the Congress of the Confederate States of America. Initial results run contrary to the ideological-boots thesis, as I uncover low levels of cross-system stability among members who moved from the U.S. House to the Confederate House. Examining further, I argue that high levels of ideological stability follow from a strong party system being in place to structure voting, which has traditionally been the case in the two-party U.S. House but was not the case in the partyless Confederate House. This result aside, I do find a moderate but increasing level of ideological stability among members of the Confederate House in a session-by-session analysis, which is robust to a serious shock (Federal invasion) to the constituency-representative linkage underlying the electoral connection. This latter finding suggests that as long as there are electoral incentives associated with ideological labels, then ideologies will develop regardless of party structure. ecent work in the field of Congressional voting behavior suggests that members of Congress (MCs) die in their ideological boots. That is, according to Poole (1998, 3), based upon the roll-call voting record, once elected to Congress, members adopt an ideological position and maintain that position throughout their careers-once a liberal or a conservative or a moderate, always a liberal or a conservative or a moderate. This finding applies not only to members of the contemporary Congress, but MCs from bygone eras as well, as Poole and Rosenthal (1997) find high levels of individual-level ideological stability across nearly all of United States Congressional history. Moreover, additional evidence suggests that members of Congress remain ideologically consistent even in the face of changing personal or electoral conditions: members' voting records remain essentially the same, regardless of whether they plan to retire (Lott 1987; Van Beek 1991; Lott and Bronars 1993; Poole and Rosenthal 1997), plan to run for a higher office (Hibbing 1986; Poole and Romer 1993), serve in a higher office (Grofman, Griffin, and Berry 1995; Poole and Rosenthal 1997), or have their districts redrawn (Poole and Romer 1993; Poole 1998). This article examines the thesis further to assess whether it is truly a general finding. Rather than examine voting behavior in the U.S. Congress, however, I focus on voting behavior in a heretofore forgotten institution in American history: the Congress of the Confederate States of America. I contend that the Confederate Congress is a suitable forum to explore the robustness of the ideological-boots thesis, because it provides two unique extensions to the study of individual-level ideological stability that cannot be pursued in a study of the U.S. Congress. First, a significant number of individuals who served in the Confederate House had
Aside · Economics · House of Representatives · Ideology · Incentive · Law and economics · Legislature · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Roll call · Sociology · Voting · Voting behavior · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Media Influence and Politics · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Legislative Organization
Legislative Voting and Accountability
Contingent Party Pressure and Legislative Gridlock
Partisan Agenda Control and the Dimensionality of Congress
Party Brands and the Democratic and Republican National Committees, 1952–1976
National Survival and the Confederate Congress
Consensus and Conflict
Desperation votes and private interests
The effect of majority party agenda setting on roll calls
Seigniorage in the Civil War South
An Electoral Connection in E uropean Parliament Voting
Examining Parties as Procedural Cartels
Gerrymanders and Theories of Law Making
Ideological Adaptation? The Survival Instinct of Threatened Legislators
When Do Legislators Represent Their Constituents? Evidence from Roll-Call and Referendum Votes
Polarization and Ideology
The Coefficient of Party Influence
Parties, preferences and influence in legislative decision-making
Get the Party Started
A Bridge to Somewhere
The Statistical Analysis Of Roll‐Call Data
Equilibrium Party Government
War, the Presidency, and Legislative Voting Behavior
Governed by Experience
Lindsey Graham and Southern Politics in State and Nation
Not on Your (Half) Life
Does Public Financing Affect Judicial Behavior? Evidence From the North Carolina Supreme Court
Legislative Responsiveness to Constituency Change
The Dimensionality of Congressional Voting Reconsidered
Strategic Opposition and Government Cohesion in Westminster Democracies
Minority Party Capacity in Congress
The Influence of Party
Yankee Leviathan
Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House
Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice
The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators
The Rationality of Ideology
An economic theory of democracy
A critical review and an extension of the political shirking literature
Southern Leviathan
Ideology, voting, and shirking
Time series evidence on shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives
Political shirking and the last term problem
Shirking and political support in the U.S. Senate, 1964?1984
The last period problem in politics
Brand names and barriers to entry in political markets
Unfastening the Electoral Connection
Look for the Party Label
Ambition in the House
Examining the Bonding Effects of Party
The Effects of Party and Preferences on Congressional Roll-Call Voting
Who Wins? Party Effects in Legislative Voting
House Members Who Become Senators
Dynamics of Congressional Loyalty
The Electoral Connection in the Early Congress
Severing the Electoral Connection
"Constructing "Us
Patterns of Congressional Voting
Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting
Voting Change in Congress
Where's the Party
The Electoral Connection Meets the Past
The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress
| Unique citing works | 32 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,33 |
| Citation span | 2002 - 2025 (24) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 32 |