Minority Party Capacity in Congress
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3549282 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew O Ballard (0000-0002-1510-4289, American University, corresponding author), James M Curry (0000-0002-1966-1410, University of Utah, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 115 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1388-1405 |
| Publication date | 2021-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0003055421000381 |
| OpenAlex | W3166045107 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 52 |
When, and under what circumstances, are congressional minority parties capable of influencing legislative outcomes? We argue that the capacity of the minority party to exert legislative influence is a function of three factors:constraintson the majority party, which createopportunitiesfor the minority party; minority partycohesionon the issue at hand; and sufficientmotivationfor the minority to engage in legislating rather than electioneering. Drawing on data on every bill considered in the House of Representatives between 1985 and 2006 and case examples of notable lawmaking efforts during the same period, we show that our theory helps predict which bills are considered on the House floor, which bills become law, and the substance of policy-making outcomes. Our findings have important implications for theories of congressional party power and our understanding of minority party influence on Capitol Hill
Cohesion (chemistry · Economics · Law and economics · Lawmaking · Legislature · Political science · Power (physics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Gender Politics and Representation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Public Administration
Shaping Appropriations
Ulterior Oversight
Interest Groups and Intra‐Party Conflict on Scored Votes
When Politics Is Not Pivotal
The Quality of Bipartisan Legislation
Toward a theory of minority-party influence in the U.S. Congress
Legislative Effectiveness in Multiparty Presidential Systems
Partisan Governance and Minority Party Vetoes
Incivility in Congressional Tweets
How Are Politicians Informed? Witnesses and Information Provision in Congress
Legislative Effectiveness in the American States
Unorthodox Lawmaking
Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving
Presidents and Assemblies
Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House
Setting the Agenda
The Limits of Party
Legislating in the Dark
Party Position Change in American Politics
Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers
Veto Bargaining
Divided we govern
Partisan Balance
Pivotal Politics
Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971–2000
Beyond Ideology
Insecure Majorities
Changing minds? Not in Congress
"The Selling of "Free Trade
Using Ecological Inference Point Estimates as Dependent Variables in Second-Stage Linear Regressions
Agenda Control in Congress
The Puzzle of Midterm Loss
Do Restrictive Rules Produce Nonmedian Outcomes? A Theory with Evidence from the 101st−108th Congresses
Balancing, Generic Polls and Midterm Congressional Elections
Bill Text and Agenda Control in the US Congress
Negative Agenda Control in the Senate and House
Dimensions, Issues, and Bills
A Theory of Competitive Partisan Lawmaking
Issue Politics in a Polarized Congress
Word Embeddings for the Analysis of Ideological Placement in Parliamentary Corpora
Assessing minority party influence on partisan issue attention in the US House of representatives, 1989–2012
Minority Rights and Majority Power
Comparing Nominate and Ideal
Tarnishing Opponents, Polarizing Congress
To Simulate or Nominate
Minority Rights and Majority Power
Bicameralism and Minority‐Party Influence on Legislative Development
Partisanship, Blame Avoidance, and the Distribution of Legislative Pork
Electoral Incentives and Partisan Conflict in Congress
Examining the Robustness of Ideological Voting
Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting
Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace
Extreme Referendum
Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress
The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data
| Unique citing works | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,75 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 11 |