Comparing Nominate and Ideal
Points of Difference and Monte Carlo Tests
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6300347 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Royce Carroll (0000-0002-3185-0329, Rice University), Jamie B Lewis (0000-0003-2605-5010, Institute of Political Science), Jeffrey B Lewis, James Lo (0000-0002-1479-4476, University of California, Los Angeles), Keith T Poole (University of California San Diego), Howard Rosenthal, Howard L Rosenthal (0000-0001-5051-1341, New York University) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 555-591 |
| Publication date | 2009-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.3162/036298009789869727 |
| OpenAlex | W3125949349 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 42 |
| References cited | 24 |
Empirical models of spatial voting allow us to infer legislators' locations in an abstract policy or ideological space using their roll‐call votes. Over the past 25 years, these models have provided new insights about the U.S. Congress, and legislative behavior more generally. There are now a number of alternative models, estimators, and software packages that researchers can use to recover latent issue or ideological spaces from voting data. These different tools usually produce substantively similar estimates, but important differences also arise. We investigated the sources of observed differences between two leading methods, NOMINATE and IDEAL. Using data from the 1994 to 1997 Supreme Court and the 109th Senate, we determined that while some observed differences in the estimates produced by each model stem from fundamental differences in the models' underlying behavioral assumptions, others arise from arbitrary differences in implementation. Our Monte Carlo experiments revealed that neither model has a clear advantage over the other in the recovery of legislator locations or roll‐call midpoints in either large or small legislatures
Econometrics · Economics · Estimator · Ideal (ethics · Ideology · Legislator · Legislature · Midpoint · Monte Carlo method · NOMINATE · Political science · Politics · Statistics · Supreme court · Voting · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Mathematics · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Congressional Polarization and Its Connection to Income Inequality
Class Politics, American-Style
Partidos políticos y política exterior en América Latina
Distances Between Parties Reconsidered
Substance and Change in Congressional Ideology
External validation of voter turnout models by concealed parameter recovery
Dynamic ideal point estimation for the European Parliament, 1980–2009
An Examination of Legislative Roll-Call Voting in the Czech Republic Using Spatial Models
Pivotal Politics as Normal Science
Measuring party loyalty
Procedural and party effects in European Parliament roll-call votes
The budgetary procedure in the European Union and the implications of the Treaty of Lisbon
Measuring Policy Positions in Political Space
How Do Electoral Incentives Affect Legislator Behavior? Evidence from U.S. State Legislatures
Ordenamiento Ideológico En La Convención Constitucional Chilena
Measuring Foreign Policy Positions of Members of the US Congress
Roll-call voting under random seating assignment
A textual Taylor rule
Government-Opposition or Left-Right? The Institutional Determinants of Voting in Legislatures
Modeling Preferences Using Roll Call Votes in Parliamentary Systems
Polarization and Ideology
Ends Against the Middle
Multiple Ideal Points
Parties as an organizational force on nonpartisan city councils
Estimating policy positions of local parties in elections with multi-vote ballots
Partisan Infighting Among House Republicans
A Bridge to Somewhere
A Direct Test of Legislative Gatekeeping
Using Cosponsorship to Estimate Ideal Points
To Simulate or Nominate
Scaling Policy Preferences from Coded Political Texts
Justices ‘en Garde
Legislative organization and ideal-point bias
Using Roll Call Estimates to Test Models of Politics
The Informative Power of Treaty Commitment
Division at the Water’s Edge
Estimating Ideal Points from Roll-Call Data
Innovations in concepts and measurement for the study of peace and conflict
Minority Party Capacity in Congress
Fast Estimation of Ideal Points with Massive Data
The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures
Voting Present
Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting
Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice
Analytical Politics
Linear Probability Models of the Demand for Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators
Bayesian Analysis of Binary and Polychotomous Response Data
Did Ralph Nader Spoil Al Gore’s Presidential Bid? A Ballot-Level Study of Green and Reform Party Voters in the 2000 Presidential Election
Bayesian Factor Analysis for Mixed Ordinal and Continuous Responses
Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999
Practical Issues in Implementing and Understanding Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation
Estimating Legislators' Preferred Points
Nonparametric Unfolding of Binary Choice Data
Estimating Voter Preference Distributions from Individual-Level Voting Data
Multidimensional Analysis of Roll Call Data via Bayesian Simulation
Ideal Point Estimation with a Small Number of Votes
Measuring Bias and Uncertainty in Ideal Point Estimates via the Parametric Bootstrap
The Geometry of Multidimensional Quadratic Utility in Models of Parliamentary Roll Call Voting
Small Chamber Ideal Point Estimation
Analysis of Congressional Coalition Patterns
Clashes in the Assembly
Applying Ideal Point Estimation Methods to the Council of Ministers
A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis
Patterns of Congressional Voting
The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data
| Unique citing works | 42 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,47 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2026 (18) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 42 |