Who Cheats? Who Loots? Political Competition and Corruption in Japan, 1947–1993
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231022 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Benjamin Nyblade (University of British Columbia), Steven R Reed (Chuo University) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 52 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 926-941 |
| Publication date | 2008-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00351.x |
| OpenAlex | W2124915799 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 55 |
| References cited | 43 |
When do politicians resort to corrupt practices? This article distinguishes between two types of corruption by politicians: illegal acts for material gain (looting) and illegal acts for electoral gain (cheating). Looting generally involves a politician “selling” influence while cheating involves a politician “buying” votes. Individual‐level analyses of new data on financial scandals and election law violations in Japan show that the determinants of cheating differ from the determinants of looting. Most notably, political experience and electoral security increase the probability of looting, but electoral insecurity combined with intraparty competition increases the probability of cheating
Business · Cheating · Competition (biology · Economics · Language change · Looting · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance · Corruption and Economic Development · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Psychology · Social Psychology
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| Unique citing works | 55 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,44 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2025 (16) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 55 |