Tax Toleration and Tax Compliance
How Government Affects the Propensity of Firms to Enter the Unofficial Economy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231173 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Douglas A Hibbs (University of Gothenburg), Violeta Piculescu |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 18-33 |
| Publication date | 2010-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00415.x |
| OpenAlex | W2169888933 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 23 |
How do government‐supplied institutional benefits and the taxation and regulation of producers affect the propensity of private firms to enter the unofficial economy and evade taxation? We propose a model in which the incentive of firms to operate underground depends on tax rates relative to firm‐specific thresholds of tax toleration that are decisively affected by quality of governance—in particular by the presence of high‐grade institutions delivering services enhancing official production that anchor profit‐maximizing firms to the official economy. Some key predictions of the model concerning the determinants of firms' tax toleration and tax compliance receive broad support from empirical analyses of enterprise‐level data from the World Bank's World Business Environment Surveys
Business · Corporate governance · Economics · Government (linguistics · Incentive · Market economy · Microeconomics · Profit (economics · Public economics · Toleration · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance · Finance · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Taxation and Compliance Studies
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Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers
Corruption
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Tax rates, tax administration and income tax evasion in Switzerland
Corruptible Law Enforcers
Trust and Taxpaying
Adaptive Political Attitudes
Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract
Progressive Taxation, Fairness, and Compliance
The Unofficial Economy in Transition
| Citations per year | 0.57 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2012 - 2024 (13) |
| Highly cited | No |