Bargaining in the Shadow of War

When Is a Peaceful Resolution Most Likely

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6231691
AutoresDonald Wittman (0000-0002-1073-4345, University of California System, autor de correspondencia)
Año2009
Volumen53
Número3
Páginas588-602
Fecha de publicación2009-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00388.x
OpenAlexW2148800280
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas8
Referencias citadas18

This article derives the optimal bargaining strategies of the belligerents when each side has private but incomplete information about the expected outcome of a war, should it take place. I show that the aggressor's demand curve can be below the defender's offer curve, that wars are possible even when both sides are jointly pessimistic, and that the relative cost of a war can radically alter the types of disputes that end in war. A simple diagram provides the intuition for most of the major propositions

Computer security · Economics · Intuition · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Pessimism · Private information retrieval · Shadow (psychology · Computer Science · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology