Economic Models of Interest Groups
An Introductory Survey
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231835 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William C Mitchell, Michael C Munger (0000-0002-2160-487X) |
| Year | 1991 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 512 |
| Publication date | 1991-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2111373 |
| OpenAlex | W2321463412 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 59 |
| References cited | 26 |
Classical pluralists, the authors of The Federalist Papers, and many modem scholars have emphasized the critical role of the interests in shaping policies. Still, in general, deductive theory has not provided the hypotheses and explanations offered by political science in studying interests. Economists studying interest groups have taken a more abstract, analytical approach, but this work is largely unknown in political science, perhaps because it is enshrouded in jargon and arcane terminology. We review this literature, using as our motivation two fundamental questions: First, how do interest groups influence policy in a democracy? Second, how should the institutions of government be designed to encourage or control this influence? The models we review are generally of a formal, mathematical nature, but we focus solely on their intuitive content and their contribution to our knowledge of democracy and representation
Democracy · Economics · Epistemology · Federalist · Government (linguistics · Jargon · Linguistics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Representation (politics · Sociology · Terminology · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Philosophy · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Social Policy and Reform Studies
NGOs in contemporary Russia
Setting the Agenda
Interest groups
Business associations and politics in the post-Edsa Philippines
Secret Government
Capital Subsidies and the Performance of Firms
Political and economic inequality and the environment
Feudal America
Restructuring and re-regulation of the Hungarian tobacco market
The power dynamics of campaign contributions and legislative rhetoric
Timing is everything? Organized interests and the timing of legislative activity
Lobbying influence
Revisiting the ESA model
Distributive consideration in institutional change
Secession Clauses
A Test of Herd Theory
Establishing a Constitutional Court? An alternative political culture approach – the Israeli case
Interest Representation and Social Policy Making
Money and rhetoric
Mobilization, Participatory Planning Institutions, and Elite Capture
The role of individual agents in promoting peace processes
An Application of Herd Theory to Interest Group Behavior
Banking regulation, regulatory capture and inequality
Corporate lobbying, political action committees, and market concentration
The prohibition-repeal amendments
Trading policy
The supply and demand of marital contracts
Risk aversion in two-period rent-seeking games
Promotion of the Agricultural Sector and Political Power in Austria
Living in the Moment
Organized Interests and Political Extortion
Are School Reopening Decisions Related to Union Influence
Technocracy and the Politics of Economic Decision Making during the Pre–Martial Law Period (1965–1972)
Corporate lobbying in the European Union
Exchanging access goods for access
Interest Group Influence in the U. S. Congress
The Effect of Direct Democracy on the Size and Diversity of State Interest Group Populations
Divided Government, Interest Representation, and Policy Differences
A Niche Theory of Interest Representation
The Distortion Gap
Self‐Provision of Public Services
Explaining Interest Group Density Across Economic Sectors
Life in a Niche
A Neopluralist Perspective on Research on Organized Interests
The Question of Committee Bias Revisited
Bias in the Heavenly Chorus
Doing Well While Intending Good
Common Property and Private Property
Party cues or policy information? The differential influence of financial and economic literacy on economic policy preferences
Regulatory policy entrepreneurship and reforms
After the Public Interest Prevails
Interest groups and policy volatility
EU lobbying
Organized Interests and the state
Targeting the lobbying effort
Competencies, Cracks, and Conflicts
The Role of Lobbyists
Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress
Are Agricultural PACs Monolithic? An Empirical Investigation of Political Contributions from Agricultural Subsectors
Politics and markets
Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy
The Use of Knowledge in Society
The Transitional Gains Trap
An economic theory of democracy
The Rise and Decline of Nations
Neoclassical Political Economy
The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society
The Theory of Committees and Elections
American Capitalism
The Logic of Collective Action
The Economic Approach to Human Behavior
The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure
Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting
Of Rule and Revenue
Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting
The control of politicians
Interest groups and the size of government
The market for special interest campaign funds
On money, votes, and policy in a democratic society
Wealth, Poverty and Politics
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
Pressure Groups and Politics in Antebellum Tariffs
Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy
Legislators and Interest Groups
| Unique citing works | 59 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,79 |
| Citation span | 1993 - 2025 (33) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 58 |