Controlling the IRS
Principals, Principles, and Public Administration
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231864 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John T Scholz, B Dan Wood |
| Year | 1998 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 141 |
| Publication date | 1998-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2991750 |
| OpenAlex | W2318533274 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 44 |
| References cited | 17 |
Theory: The behavior of government agencies reflects democratic principles of equal treatment and efficiency as well as the more-studied principle of responsiveness to elected political principals. Hypothesis: The variance in IRS enforcement actions against individual and corporate taxpayers across states and time can be explained by measures reflecting equal treatment of taxpayers, enforcement efficiency, and responsiveness to elected officials. Methods: We test the hypothesis using regression analysis of a pooled time-series of state-level audits of corporate and individual tax returns for the period of 1974-92. Results: The odds of corporate versus individual audits increase with increased Democratic control over Congress and change with different presidential administrations, but not with changes in state-level partisanship. The odds also respond significantly to changes in the composition of the taxpaying district and revenue base, suggesting IRS responsiveness to equity and efficiency
Audit · Business · Democracy · Economics · Enforcement · Equity (law · Logistic regression · Odds · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Public economics · Revenue · State (computer science · Accounting · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration · Taxation and Compliance Studies
Generalized Estimating Equation Models for Correlated Data
The Politics of Institutional Weakness in Latin America
Agency Design and Distributive Politics
Litigation, Courts, and Bureaucratic Policy
Bureaucratic Performance and Control in British Politics
Decision Making in the Hidden Judiciary
Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch
Congressional Use of Authorization and Oversight
The Administrative Presidency and Bureaucratic Control
The Politicized Enforcement of Laws Criminalizing Executive Branch Conflicts of Interest
Back to the Future? Toward Revitalizing the Study of the Administrative Presidency
Technical Management in an Age of Openness
The De Facto Independence of Federal Offices of Inspector General
The political economy of tax enforcement
Problemas del cobro del impuesto predial y sus efectos sociales en contextos de conflicto armado. Los casos de Carmen de Bolívar y Turbo en Colombia
Global Crises, American Public Administration, and the “New Interventionism” Revisited
Political Influence and Policy Variation
Examining Environmental Justice in Facility-Level Regulatory Enforcement
The Effect of Race‐Based Admissions in Public Universities
Federal and State Public Forest Administration in the New Millennium
Trading Speed for Accuracy? Managing Goal Conflict and Accommodation in the U.S. Unemployment Insurance Program
Bureaucratic Behavior in Strategic Environments
Environmental Free Riding in State Water Pollution Enforcement
Regulating Hate
Principals, Agents, and the Impact of Regulatory Federalism on the Savings-and-Loans Crisis of the 1980s
Ministerial Leadership and Endorsement of Bureaucrats
Regional Court Influence Over Bureaucratic Policymaking
Who’s Whispering in Your Ear? The Influence of Third Parties Over State Agency Decisions
Controlling Forum Choice and Controlling Policy
What motivates street-level bureaucrats to implement the reforms of elected politicians
Getting a Poor Return
Congress as manager
A Closer Look at Contract Accountability
A Political Consequence of Contracting
Legislative Success and Failure and Participation in Rule Making
Efficiency, Equity, and Politics
Cooperation, Reciprocity, and the Collective-Action Heuristic
Cooptation or Transformation? Local Policy Networks and Federal Regulatory Enforcement
Influencing the Bureaucracy
Negative Lobbying and Policy Outcomes
Interest Group Competition on Federal Agency Rules
Political Influence and Tarp
Strategically Prophetic Priests
Pre-Trial Bargaining and Litigation
Spurious regressions in econometrics
Tva and the Grass Roots
Analysis of Panel Data
Of Rule and Revenue
Going by the Book
Bureaucratic Dynamics
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
The Dynamics of Political-Bureaucratic Adaptation
Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration
Presidential Control versus Bureaucratic Power
Does Politics Make a Difference at the EEOC
The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration
Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements
The Political Economy of Federalism
Street-Level Political Controls Over Federal Bureaucracy
Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation
| Unique citing works | 44 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,63 |
| Citation span | 1999 - 2022 (24) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 43 |