Pre-Trial Bargaining and Litigation

The Search for Fairness and Efficiency

Bibliographic Data

ID4085552
AuthorsRobert M Howard, Richard E Chard, Richard Chard (0000-0002-8549-055X), Joel T Kaji, Jeffrey Davis (0000-0003-0059-7348)
Year2000
Volume34
Issue2
Pages431-456
Publication date2000-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueLaw & Society Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0023-9216 • E-ISSN: 1540-5893
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/3115089
OpenAlexW2093292332
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited29

The formal literature on pre-trial bargaining offers considerable insight on how different bargaining procedures asymmetric information affect efficiency. Less attention has been paid to fairness, despite the fact that fairness is an essential component of any system of justice. We address this state of affairs by analyzing the equilibria of a pre-trial bargaining model for both fairness and efficiency. This analysis involves ascertaining whether fair and efficient equilibria are possible and whether they occur for common parameter values, and characterizing their behavioral and distributional properties. We conclude that fairness is a paramount concern to litigants and society and that fair and efficient equilibria are possible

Actuarial science · Business · Economics · Law and economics · Criminal Law and Evidence · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies

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