A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive Turnout
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231872 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Timothy Feddersen (0000-0002-4103-080X, Decision Sciences (United States), corresponding author), Timothy J Feddersen |
| Year | 1992 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 938 |
| Publication date | 1992-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2111355 |
| OpenAlex | W2071044001 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 65 |
| References cited | 15 |
This paper presents a model of costly voting under plurality rule that omits parties as strategic actors and implies Duverger's Law and positive turnout. The model demonstrates that strategic voting reduces the number of parties that receive votes under plurality rule to two or less while positive costs to vote increases the number to more than one. The two assumptions taken together lead to exactly two parties receiving votes
Bullet voting · Cardinal voting systems · Duverger's law · Economics · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Split-ticket voting · Turnout · Voting · Economic Policies and Impacts · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
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| Unique citing works | 65 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,03 |
| Citation span | 1994 - 2025 (32) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 65 |