Candidate Entry and Political Polarization
An Experimental Study
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3222273 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jens Großer (0000-0002-0362-3241, Florida State University, corresponding author), Thomas R Palfrey (0000-0003-0769-8109, California Institute of Technology, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 113 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 209-225 |
| Publication date | 2019-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0003055418000631 |
| OpenAlex | W2615524881 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 34 |
We report the results of a laboratory experiment based on a citizen-candidate model with private information about ideal points. Inefficient political polarization is observed in all treatments; that is, citizens with extreme ideal points enter as candidates more often than moderate citizens. Second, less entry occurs, with even greater polarization, when voters have directional information about candidates' ideal points, using ideological party labels. Nonetheless, this directional information is welfare enhancing because the inefficiency from greater polarization is outweighed by lower entry expenses and better voter information. Third, entry rates are decreasing in group size and the entry cost. These findings are all implied by properties of the unique symmetric Bayesian equilibrium cutpoint pair of the entry game. Quantitatively, we observe too little (too much) entry when the theoretical entry rates are high (low). This general pattern of observed biases in entry rates is implied by logit quantal response equilibrium
Barriers to entry · Computer security · Econometrics · Economics · Geometry · Ideal (ethics · Ideal point · Ideology · Inefficiency · Microeconomics · Polarization (electrochemistry · Political science · Politics · Private information retrieval · Welfare · Chemistry · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Mathematics
The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion
Overconfidence and Excess Entry
An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games
Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
Subject pool recruitment procedures
Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
An economic theory of democracy
Uninformed Why People Seem to Know So Little about Politics and What We Can Do about It
Overconfidence in Political Behavior
Proportional Representation with Citizen Candidates
The Citizen Candidate Model
Stability in Competition
Media and Political Polarization
A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive Turnout
An Informational Rationale for Political Parties
The Relationship between Information, Ideology, and Voting Behavior
Candidate Entry and Political Polarization
Rational Voting and Candidate Entry under Plurality Rule
Leapfrog Representation and Extremism
The Strength of Issues
The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study
An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in Models of Political Participation
Candidate Motivation
A Directional Theory of Issue Voting
Have American's Social Attitudes Become More Polarized
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2025 (8) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |