Jens Großer
Biographic Data
| ID | 1052011 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jens Großer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jens |
| FAMILY NAME | Großer |
| SIGNATURE | GROßER J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Florida State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0362-3241 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 80 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Experimental Study
We report the results of a laboratory experiment based on a citizen-candidate model with private information about ideal points. Inefficient political polarization is observed in all treatments; that is, citizens with extreme ideal points enter as candidates more often than moderate citizens. Second, less entry occurs, with even greater polarization, when voters have directional information about candidates' ideal points, using ideological party …
Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Antimedian Voter Theorem
We study a citizen‐candidate‐entry model with private information about ideal points. We fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the entry game and show that only relatively “extreme” citizen types enter the electoral competition as candidates, whereas more “moderate” types never enter. It generally leads to substantial political polarization, even when the electorate is not polarized and citizens understand that they vote for more…
Political Quid Pro Quo Agreements: An Experimental Study
We experimentally study the common wisdom that money buys political influence. In the game, one special interest (i.e., a corporate firm) has the opportunity to influence redistributive tax policies in her favor by transferring money to two competing candidates. The success of the investment depends on whether or not the candidates are willing and able to collude on low‐tax policies that do not harm their relative chances in the elections. In the…
Public Opinion Polls, Voter Turnout, and Welfare: An Experimental Study
We experimentally study the impact of public opinion poll releases on voter turnout and welfare in a participation game. We find higher overall turnout rates when polls inform the electorate about the levels of support for the candidates than when polls are prohibited. Distinguishing between allied and floating voters, our data show that this increase in turnout is entirely due to floating voters. When polls indicate equal levels of support for t…
Neighborhood Information Exchange and Voter Participation: An Experimental Study
We study the effect of social embeddedness on voter turnout by investigating the role of information about other voters' decisions. We do so in a participation game, in which we distinguish between early and late voters. Each late voter is told about one early voter's turnout decision. Cases are distinguished where the voters are allies (support the same group) or adversaries (with opposing preferences) and where they are uncertain about each oth…
Neighborhood Information Exchange and Voter Participation: An Experimental Study
We study the effect of social embeddedness on voter turnout by investigating the role of information about other voters' decisions. We do so in a participation game, in which we distinguish between early and late voters. Each late voter is told about one early voter's turnout decision. Cases are distinguished where the voters are allies (support the same group) or adversaries (with opposing preferences) and where they are uncertain about each oth…
Public Opinion Polls, Voter Turnout, and Welfare: An Experimental Study
We experimentally study the impact of public opinion poll releases on voter turnout and welfare in a participation game. We find higher overall turnout rates when polls inform the electorate about the levels of support for the candidates than when polls are prohibited. Distinguishing between allied and floating voters, our data show that this increase in turnout is entirely due to floating voters. When polls indicate equal levels of support for t…
Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Antimedian Voter Theorem
We study a citizen‐candidate‐entry model with private information about ideal points. We fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the entry game and show that only relatively “extreme” citizen types enter the electoral competition as candidates, whereas more “moderate” types never enter. It generally leads to substantial political polarization, even when the electorate is not polarized and citizens understand that they vote for more…
Political Quid Pro Quo Agreements: An Experimental Study
We experimentally study the common wisdom that money buys political influence. In the game, one special interest (i.e., a corporate firm) has the opportunity to influence redistributive tax policies in her favor by transferring money to two competing candidates. The success of the investment depends on whether or not the candidates are willing and able to collude on low‐tax policies that do not harm their relative chances in the elections. In the…
Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Experimental Study
We report the results of a laboratory experiment based on a citizen-candidate model with private information about ideal points. Inefficient political polarization is observed in all treatments; that is, citizens with extreme ideal points enter as candidates more often than moderate citizens. Second, less entry occurs, with even greater polarization, when voters have directional information about candidates' ideal points, using ideological party …
Neighborhood Information Exchange and Voter Participation: An Experimental Study
We study the effect of social embeddedness on voter turnout by investigating the role of information about other voters' decisions. We do so in a participation game, in which we distinguish between early and late voters. Each late voter is told about one early voter's turnout decision. Cases are distinguished where the voters are allies (support the same group) or adversaries (with opposing preferences) and where they are uncertain about each oth…
Public Opinion Polls, Voter Turnout, and Welfare: An Experimental Study
We experimentally study the impact of public opinion poll releases on voter turnout and welfare in a participation game. We find higher overall turnout rates when polls inform the electorate about the levels of support for the candidates than when polls are prohibited. Distinguishing between allied and floating voters, our data show that this increase in turnout is entirely due to floating voters. When polls indicate equal levels of support for t…
Political Quid Pro Quo Agreements: An Experimental Study
We experimentally study the common wisdom that money buys political influence. In the game, one special interest (i.e., a corporate firm) has the opportunity to influence redistributive tax policies in her favor by transferring money to two competing candidates. The success of the investment depends on whether or not the candidates are willing and able to collude on low‐tax policies that do not harm their relative chances in the elections. In the…
Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Antimedian Voter Theorem
We study a citizen‐candidate‐entry model with private information about ideal points. We fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the entry game and show that only relatively “extreme” citizen types enter the electoral competition as candidates, whereas more “moderate” types never enter. It generally leads to substantial political polarization, even when the electorate is not polarized and citizens understand that they vote for more…
Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Experimental Study
We report the results of a laboratory experiment based on a citizen-candidate model with private information about ideal points. Inefficient political polarization is observed in all treatments; that is, citizens with extreme ideal points enter as candidates more often than moderate citizens. Second, less entry occurs, with even greater polarization, when voters have directional information about candidates' ideal points, using ideological party …
Economics (5 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Politics (5 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works)