Political Quid Pro Quo Agreements
An Experimental Study
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231506 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jens Großer (0000-0002-0362-3241, Florida State University and Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton), Ernesto Reuben (0000-0001-9425-4607, Columbia University and IZA), Agnieszka Tymula (0000-0002-0521-8477, New York University) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 582-597 |
| Publication date | 2013-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.12015 |
| OpenAlex | W2106870471 |
| Language | IT |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 49 |
We experimentally study the common wisdom that money buys political influence. In the game, one special interest (i.e., a corporate firm) has the opportunity to influence redistributive tax policies in her favor by transferring money to two competing candidates. The success of the investment depends on whether or not the candidates are willing and able to collude on low‐tax policies that do not harm their relative chances in the elections. In the experiment, successful political influence never materializes when the firm and candidates interact just once. By contrast, it yields substantially lower redistribution in about 40% of societies with finitely repeated encounters. However, investments are not always profitable, and profit sharing between the firm and candidates depends on prominent equity norms. Our experimental results shed new light on the complex process of buying political influence in everyday politics and help explain why only relatively few firms do actually attempt to influence policymaking
Business · Economics · Equity (law · Harm · Law and economics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Monetary economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Profit (economics · Public economics · Redistribution (election · Status quo · Economic Policies and Impacts · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law
Committee Decision-Making under the Threat of Leaks
How Conditioning on Posttreatment Variables Can Ruin Your Experiment and What to Do about It
Access to Proposers and Influence in Collective Policy Making
Practical and Effective Approaches to Dealing With Clustered Data
Money in the Middle
Donations and dependence
The hollow core
Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories
Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft
Long-Term Investing in Politicians; Or, Give Early, Give Often
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft
The Logic of Collective Action
Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting
Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics
Lobbying and asymmetric information
The economics of campaign funds
On money, votes, and policy in a democratic society
Political contribution and policy — Some extensions
Campaign Contributions as Investments
More of the Same
Interest Group Activity in the States
Consumption or Investment? On Motivations for Political Giving
Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence
Information and Influence
Lobbying and Taxes
Bribing Voters
Theory and Evidence for Counteractive Lobbying
The Logic of Private and Collective Action
Counteractive Lobbying
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
The Effect of Political Trust on the Presidential Vote, 1968-96
The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists
Buying Time
Legislators and Interest Groups
The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978-1986
The Political Relevance of Political Trust
Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress
Campaign Contributions and Access
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,6 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2023 (8) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |