Congressional Politics of International Financial Rescues
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231971 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J Lawrence Broz (0000-0002-3866-1336, University of California San Diego, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 479-496 |
| Publication date | 2005-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00137.x |
| OpenAlex | W2072495326 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 47 |
| References cited | 39 |
In the 1990s, the American executive organized financial rescues for Mexico and several Asian economies. These rescues were controversial in Congress, where members voted repeatedly to reduce or eliminate the executive's freedom to engage in them. I analyze these roll calls with an eye toward explaining who opposes and who supports international financial rescues. I argue that the interests of private actors (district constituencies and interest groups) have an important effect on member voting. Following Stolper‐Samuelson reasoning, I find that a member is significantly more likely to favor (oppose) rescues as the proportion of high‐skilled (low‐skilled) workers in a district increases. In addition, I find that campaign contributions from international banks increase the probability that a member will vote in favor of rescues. Overall, the findings suggest that the distributional effects of rescues find expression in Congress and constrain U.S. international financial policymaking
Business · Economics · European union · Executive branch · International economics · Member states · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Voting · International Development and Aid · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Social Policy and Reform Studies
Donors and domestic politics
The Political Economy of u.s. Foreign Aid
Going to extremes
Everyday Politics of the World Economy
Public Opinion and Foreign Aid
The power of the banking lobby and its consequences
Campaign Contributions and U.S. Foreign Policy Outcomes
Policy Domain‐Specific Ideology
Why delegate to the IMF? Congressional preference and blame avoidance
Security ties or electoral connections? The US Congress and the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement, 2007-2011
Brave New World? Macro-prudential policy and the new political economy of the federal reserve
Engaged Hawks and Quiet Doves
The IMF, Domestic Public Sector Banks, and Currency Crises in Developing States
A Grave Case of Myopia
Room for discretion? Biased decision-making in international financial institutions
Linkage Diplomacy
Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly
Neoliberalism and banking crisis bailouts
Finanzialisierung, Demokratie und Gesellschaft – zehn Jahre nach Beginn der Finanzkrise
Institutional foundations of financial statecraft
Vote Switching on Foreign Policy in the U.S. House of Representatives
Preferences for International Redistribution
Left-Right Ideology and the Debate over International Bailouts
Deserving Government Assistance? Public Support for Aid to Struggling Firms and Workers
The Repercussions of Realignment
Fed Up
Trade Policy, Economic Interests, and Party Politics in a Developing Country
Shopping for Protection
Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending
Tertiarization, Industrial Adjustment, and the Domestic Politics of Foreign Aid1
Winners and Losers in International Trade
The Domestic Politics of World Power
Multilateralism and Democracy
The Political Economy of Bilateral Bailouts
Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy
Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund
Economic Interests and Public Support for American Global Activism
Politicizing International Cooperation
Policy design and domestic support for international bailouts
The politics of international redistribution
Strategic Targeting
The Governance of International Finance
International Institutions and Domestic Compensation
Interests, Norms and Support for the Provision of Global Public Goods
Congress and Foreign Policy
Domestic Distributional Roots of National Interest
Domestic Lobbying for External Change
Delegating Powers
Has Globalization Gone Too Far?
What determines individual trade-policy preferences?
Protection and Real Wages
Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions
Clarify
Long-Term Investing in Politicians; Or, Give Early, Give Often
Has Globalization Gone Too Far
Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences Over Immigration Policy
Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics
The International Monetary Fund and developing countries
The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle
The Wind of the Hundred Days
On Measuring Partisanship in Roll-Call Voting
Quiet Influence
The Origins of Financial Openness
Making the Most of Statistical Analyses
Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
PACs and the Congressional Supermarket
Globalization, Labor Markets and Policy Backlash in the Past
Are Your Wages Set in Beijing
International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability
Buying Time
Legislators and Interest Groups
| Unique citing works | 47 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,88 |
| Citation span | 2001 - 2026 (26) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 47 |