Corrupting International Organizations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6232795 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James Raymond Vreeland (0000-0002-3429-8517, Princeton University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 205-222 |
| Publication date | 2019-05-11 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Annual Review of Political Science (BOOK_SERIES) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1094-2939 • E-ISSN: 1545-1577 |
| Publisher | Annual Reviews (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-071031 |
| OpenAlex | W2946558924 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 30 |
| References cited | 111 |
As the world turns against international institutions, this article reviews evidence of the corrupting of global organizations. The review focuses on three international organizations that emerged from World War II: the Bretton Woods institutions [the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank] and the United Nations (UN). The article explores evidence of major shareholders (mainly the United States) using the Bretton Woods institutions to funnel money and other favors to strategically preferred countries. Then the review discusses vote buying across a range of issues debated at the UN and finally turns to dark scholarship on the use of UN human rights institutions by autocratic states as a veil to violate those very rights. The article concludes that government pursuit of strategic objectives may be a necessary part of global cooperation, but scholarship should continue to delve into the micro foundations underlying the macro evidence presented here to better inform reformers on how to limit corrupting influences
Autocracy · Democracy · Economics · Government (linguistics · Human rights · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Scholarship · Human Rights and Development · International Development and Aid · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Public Administration
The international law violations in the Russian special military operation in Ukraine case and the international community's efforts to protect
Home turf
Transnational Authoritarianism
Issue congruence in international organizations
The World Health Organization in Contagion (2011) and World War Z (2013)
Controlling International Institutions
Climate policy at the International Monetary Fund
Authoritarian norm entrepreneurs
The IMF, Structural Adjustment, and Poverty
Power, persuasion and preservation
A fox in the henhouse
Rethinking Tests of the IO Effectiveness Hypothesis
Legislative Process in International Organizations
What Are UN General Assembly Resolutions for? Four Views on Parliamentary Diplomacy
Mediating power? Delegation, pooling and leadership selection at international organisations
Rewarding a friend
Caught in the inclusion trap
Do Gladiators Fight for Their Masters? Voting Behavior of the US-Promoted United Nations Security Council Members in the Early Cold War
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as an instrument for Chinese influence? Supplementary versus remedial multilateralism
Pleasing the Buyer
African agency and China’s influence
Reversals of Capacity
Empowered by Information
Diffusing Risk
Are non-democracies taking over? Autocratization and international organization membership
Formal governance matters
Core funding and the performance of international organizations
Earmarked Funding and the Control–Performance Trade-Off in International Development Organizations
Biased bureaucrats and the policies of international organizations
Informal state influence in international organizations
Hypocrisy Trap
The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council
The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy
Lending Credibility
Controlling Institutions
Securing Approval
Global horse trading
Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions
Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems
IMF programs
Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?
Renegotiating the World Order
The World Bank
US politics and World Bank IDA-lending
Contentious Compliance
Making Human Rights a Reality
Human Rights and Structural Adjustment
Mobilizing for Human Rights
State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace
Foreign aid funnel? A placebo-based assessment of aid flows to non-permanent United Nations Security Council members
Foreign Aid and Voting Behavior in an International Organization
Impact of Regime Type on the Influence of U.S. Foreign Aid
Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention Against Torture
American Interests and IMF Lending
American politicization of the International Monetary Fund
Vote-trading in International Institutions
Law versus the State
IMF conditionality
Consensus Decisions and Similarity Measures in International Organizations
With a little help from my friends
Geopolitics and international organizations
Room for discretion? Biased decision-making in international financial institutions
Development aid and international politics
Competing models of international lending activity
Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis
The political economy of IMF forecasts
The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council
Do human rights offenders oppose human rights resolutions in the United Nations
Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly
How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations
U.S. Foreign Aid and UN Voting
Interest Coalitions and Multilateral Aid Allocation in the European Union
The High Politics of IMF Lending
Corporate Influence in World Bank Lending
The Foreign Policy Consequences of Trade
Treaties, Tenure, and Torture
Explaining Commitment
Aid for Vote? United Nations General Assembly Voting and American Aid Allocation
International Organizations and Naming and Shaming
Sins of Commission? Understanding Membership Patterns on the United Nations Human Rights Commission
Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties
Misplaced Blame
Exploring the Universe of UN Human Rights Agreements
The Pernicious Consequences of UN Security Council Membership
Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data
Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights
Leader Turnover, Institutions, and Voting at the UN General Assembly
Divergent Incentives for Dictators
Aid
Why States Act through Formal International Organizations
Leadership Turnover and Foreign Policy Change
Rewards for Ratification
The Politics of Shame
Ratification Patterns and the International Criminal Court1
Bypass or Engage? Explaining Donor Delivery Tactics in Foreign Aid Allocation
Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation
Money Talks
Multilateralism and Democracy
Democracy and Multilateralism
The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force
International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America
Bloc Voting in the General Assembly
Beyond Institutional Design
Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation
The Scope of IMF Conditionality
Political Institutions and Human Rights
The IMF As a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism
Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court
International Negotiations and Domestic Politics
Aid as a building bloc
International Regimes for Human Rights
IMF Conditionality, Government Partisanship, and the Progress of Economic Reforms
Mixed Signals
The Costs of Favoritism
The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa
Contracting around International Uncertainty
International Human Rights Law and the Politics of Legitimation
Human Rights in a Globalizing World
| Unique citing works | 30 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 5 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 30 |