Divergent Incentives for Dictators
Domestic Institutions and (International Promises Not to) Torture
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283576 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Courtenay R Conrad (0000-0002-7963-3083, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 34-67 |
| Publication date | 2014-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002712459707 |
| OpenAlex | W2141977444 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 43 |
| References cited | 87 |
Although they are arguably the worst violators of human rights, dictators sometimes commit to international human rights treaties like the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) to appease their domestic opposition. Importantly, however, executives facing effective judiciaries must anticipate ex post costs that can arise when international treaties are likely to be enforced domestically. This suggests that one domestic institution—a political opposition party—may provide a dictator with incentives to commit to international human rights treaties and violate human rights, while another—an effective domestic judiciary—may constrain the dictator’s ability to violate human rights and incentivize him to avoid international commitment. How do dictators make choices about commitment to human rights law and respect for human rights when they face conflicting domestic incentives? Furthermore, how do these divergent incentives affect compliance when dictators do commit to international treaties? In this article, I argue that the domestic incentives dictators face to support the CAT and engage in torture are moderated in countries with effective domestic judiciaries
Commit · Convention · Dictator · Economics · Human rights · Incentive · International human rights law · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Opposition (politics · Political science · Politics · Torture · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · Historical and Contemporary Political Dynamics · International Law and Human Rights · Law
Committed to Rights
Rhetoric and Reality
Survival-contingent learning and the diffusion of human rights treaty ratification
Understanding and Preventing Torture
U.S. government deception in the Luis Posada scandal
Empirical Studies of Human Rights Law
Mind the understanding gap
Keeping out of harm’s way? Constitutional due process and state repression
Legal commitments to United Nations human rights treaties and higher monitoring standards in the Universal Periodic Review
Strategies of political control and regime survival in autocracies
States living in glasshouses
Domestic politics and requests for Unesco’s international assistance program
Security-Civil Liberties Trade-offs
Complying with Human Rights
The Strength of Weak Review
Difusores y justicieros. Las instituciones judiciales en la política de derechos humanos
Assessing the Expected Impact of Global Health Treaties
Oil discoveries, civil war, and preventive state repression
Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter? Evidence from the Convention Against Torture
Best Evidence
Power Sharing, Protection, and Peace
Democracy and the Concept of Personal Integrity Rights
Export Diversity and Human Rights
Exploring the Universe of UN Human Rights Agreements
Authoritarian Institutions and State Repression
Individual Mobilization by Victims of Human Rights Abuse
The Politics of Punishment
Do Arms Control Treaties Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
Religion and the authoritarian toolkit
Collective Action and Constraints on Repression at the Endgame
(Cautiously) Embracing pro-Palestinian activism in Singapore
How International Actors Help Enforce Domestic Deals
International Regimes for Human Rights
Corrupting International Organizations
Legislative Veto Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements
Bureaucratic Structure and Compliance with International Agreements
Bankrolling Repression? Modeling Third‐Party Influence on Protests and Repression
Making Promises, Keeping Promises
The Changing Standard of Accountability and the Positive Relationship between Human Rights Treaty Ratification and Compliance
A dictator's toolkit
United Nations endorsement and support for human rights
Electoral institutions and repression in dictatorships
An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression
Political Order in Changing Societies
Political terror in communist systems
Government violence and repression
Judicial Review in New Democracies
Courts
Voting for Autocracy
Courts under Constraints
Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes
The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany
World society and human rights
Contract-Intensive Money
Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World, 1987
Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication
Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?
Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World
Democracy and Development
The Pinochet Case
The Origins of Totalitarianism
The Logic of Political Survival
Political Institutions under Dictatorship
Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships
The Cingranelli and Richards (Ciri) Human Rights Data Project
The Struggle for Constitutional Power
Structuring Conflict in the Arab World
Mobilizing for Human Rights
State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace
Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention Against Torture
Dialogue with Dictators
Law versus the State
Constitutional Review and the Selective Promotion of Case Results
Democracy and dictatorship revisited
Classifying political regimes
Constitutions and Commitment
Democratic Experiments in Africa
Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited
The Origins of Human Rights Regimes
Taking Time Seriously
Constrained Concessions
Human Rights Violations, Umbrella Concepts, and Empirical Analysis
"Constitutional Promises" and Repressive Reality
What Attracts Foreign Investors? An Examination of Human Rights and Foreign Direct Investment
The Human Rights Peace
Is The Law a Mere Parchment Barrier to Human Rights Abuse
Explaining Commitment
Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights (1977-1996)
Back to the Future
Understanding Interaction Models
Towards Juristocracy
Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties
Deterrence or Escalation
Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights
Thinking Inside the Box
Money with a Mean Streak? Foreign Economic Penetration and Government Respect for Human Rights in Developing Countries
The Human Rights Effects of World Bank Structural Adjustment, 1981-2000
Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights
Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation
Varying methods of state violence
International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America
Judicial Power in Domestic and International Politics
Political Institutions and Human Rights
Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions
What Stops the Torture
Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
State Repression and Political Order
Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s
The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law
From ballots to bullets
Threat and Repression
State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace
Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance
International Human Rights Law and the Politics of Legitimation
Human Rights in a Globalizing World
| Unique citing works | 43 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,07 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2026 (15) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 43 |