The Politics of Central Bank Independence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6232882 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jose Fernandez-Albertos (0000-0001-5325-6710, Institute for Policies and Public Goods – Spanish National Research Council (CSIC), Madrid 28037, Spain, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 217-237 |
| Publication date | 2015-05-11 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Annual Review of Political Science (BOOK_SERIES) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1094-2939 • E-ISSN: 1545-1577 |
| Publisher | Annual Reviews (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-221121 |
| OpenAlex | W1994589205 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 64 |
| References cited | 98 |
This article reviews recent contributions addressing the following questions: Under what circumstances is monetary policy delegated to politically independent central banks? What effects do these politically independent institutions have, and how do they interact with their macroeconomic institutional environment? What explains the variation in their behavior? And finally, to what extent has the recent economic crisis altered the role of these institutions? In answering these questions, this article advances two arguments. First, even though central banks' activities involve a great deal of technical knowledge, they are unavoidably political institutions: They make distributional choices informed by ideas, preferences, and the political context in which they operate. Second, the economic crisis, by expanding the type of activities that monetary authorities undertake, further contributes to the politicization of these institutions. The final section of the article speculates about the implications of these developments for economic policy making in contemporary democracies
Central bank · Context (archaeology · Economics · Independence (probability theory · Macroeconomics · Monetary policy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Law
Waivers and frauds
Hyper-active Governance
As bases jurídico-institucionais da autonomia operacional do Banco Central do Brasil - 1999-2020
Central bank independence, a not so new idea in the history of economic thought
Monetary policy decision-making by committee
Political influence, central bank independence and inflation in Africa
Political monetary cycles
The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence
How do the media scrutinise central banking? Evidence from the Bank of England
Competence–Control Theory
This is a Man’s world
The Democratic Challenge of Central Bank Credit Policies
Central bank independence and fiscal rule under populist leader's regime
Militant constitutionalism
Maastricht Overcome
Political polarization, term length and too much delegation
Theoretical perspectives on the new era of central banking
Masters of the ‘masters of the universe’? Monetary, fiscal and financial dominance in the Eurozone
Signaling to creditors and voters
Do fiscal rules reduce political polarization
Too contested to avoid, too complex to normalise
Business elites and populism
Inter-Organisational Distrust and the Political Economy of Central Bank Independence in the UK
Depoliticising monetary tightening
Central Bank Reform and the Politics of Blame Avoidance in the UK
Fed Up
Why Study Monetary Politics
Independent or lonely? Central banking in crisis
One state, one interest? How a historic shock to the balance of power of the Bundesbank and the German government laid the path for fiscal austerity
Delegation in Democracy
Instrumentalizing EMU’s democratic deficit
Tweeter‐in‐chief
Economic instrument or political tool? An assessment of the socioeconomic outcomes of the Central Bank of Nigeria’s 2022 currency redesign and cashless policy
Central Bank Independence in the World
Beyond Separation of Powers
Political central bank coverage
Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries
Targeting inflation targeting
Politics and the UK's monetary policy
Is Inequality a Side Effect of Central Bank Independence
Strategic repoliticisation
The politics of quantitative easing and housing stimulus by the Federal Reserve and European Central Bank, 2008‒2018
The Politicization of the European Central Bank
From a Deficit of Democracy to a Technocratic Order
When partisanship and technocratic credibility collide
Central banks, monetary stability, and the varieties of capital control liberalization
How central bank independence shapes monetary policy communication
Climate-related risks to central bank independence
The Ethics of Delegating Monetary Policy
The Political Economy of Central Banking in Turkey
Fiscal rules and electoral turnout
Whither Are We Bound? New Insights on American Economic Policymaking
Guiding or Following the Crowd? Strategic Communication as Reputational and Regulatory Strategy
An unexpected climate activist
Empowering women in central banking
Rethinking Central-Bank Independence
Revisiting Central Bank Independence in the World
Interests over institutions
Opportunistic, not Optimal Delegation
Populism and De Facto Central Bank Independence
Defining Bureaucratic Autonomy
The Side Effects of Central Bank Independence
Ideas behind transformative innovation policy
Independent Agencies, Distribution, and Legitimacy
Gatekeepers of Growth
Political Economy in Macroeconomics
Making the European Monetary Union
Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy
Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics
Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries
Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I
Bureaucrats or politicians? Part II
Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Preferences over Inflation and Unemployment
Veto Players
Learning, Policy Making, and Market Reforms
The Trilemma in History
The Same, But Different
The Handbook of the Political Economy of Financial Crises
Monetary Politics
Central bank independence
Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU
The political economy of inflation
Central bank independence and inflation
Independent central banks, regime type, and fiscal performance
Rules Rather than Discretion
Appointing Central Bankers
Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union
Real Sources of European Currency Policy
Mixed Signals
A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence
Federalism and Central bank Independence
Rational Fictions
Financial Regulation, Monetary Policy, and Inflation in the Industrialized World
The Institutional Design of EMU
The role of the Delors Committee in the creation of EMU
Elections, Special Interests, and Financial Crisis
Capital Rules
The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation? A Postcrisis Research Agenda
The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation
The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions
Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes
Political Parties and Monetary Commitments
Exchange Rate Regimes and Independent Central Banks
Public Inflation Aversion and the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policymaking
Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions
Regulating Capital
The Politics of Central Bank Independence
Central Banks, Partisan Politics, and Macroeconomic Outcomes
Escaping the Ties That Bind
Political Liabilities
How Domestic Is Domestic Politics? Globalization and Elections
Constitutional Courts in Comparative Perspective
Partially Independent Central Banks, Politically Responsive Governments, and Inflation
Gordon Unbound
Assets in Crisis
It's Baaack
Restraining regulatory capture? Anglo-America, crisis politics and trajectories of change in global financial governance
Globalization Pressures and the State
| Unique citing works | 64 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 6,4 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 63 |