The Regional Veto Formula and Its Effects on Canada's Constitutional Amendment Process

Bibliographic Data

ID6239358
AuthorsAndrew Heard (Simon Fraser University), Tim Swartz, Tim B Swartz (0000-0001-6092-6727, Simon Fraser University)
Year1997
Volume30
Issue2
Pages339-356
Publication date1997-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueCanadian Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0008-4239 • E-ISSN: 1744-9324
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0008423900015468
OpenAlexW2127773562
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited8

In early 1996, Canada's federal government enacted a new constitutional amending process to provide provincial and regional vetoes over future amendments. This study compares the new process with the “7 and 50” formula found in the Constitution Act, 1982. Using the Banzhaf Index as well as separate measures for the power to prevent and the power to initiate amendments, the article examines the relative influence of the provinces under the two amending formulae. As well, it examines the relative voting power of each province's citizens in any future constitutional referendum. The results show that profound changes are produced by the regional veto amending formula, and the article discusses some remedies for the most negative effects

Amendment · Constitution · Constitutional amendment · Constitutional law · Economics · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Power index · Process (computing · Public economics · Referendum · Veto · Voting · Computer Science · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Political Systems and Governance · Public Administration

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