Spending on Political Staffers and the Revealed Preferences of Cabinet
Examining a New Data Source on Federal Political Staff in Canada
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6242555 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jennifer Robson (0000-0001-5747-7625, Carleton University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 675-697 |
| Publication date | 2015-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Canadian Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0008-4239 • E-ISSN: 1744-9324 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0008423915000529 |
| OpenAlex | W2606199036 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 30 |
There is no unifying theory to guide the study of partisan political staff. The literature suggests staffers may be variously mechanisms for resolving principal-agent problems, extensions of centralized political control or spoils given as rewards inside the core executive. Annual Public Accounts data, available only since 2007, offer a promising new addition to the debate over federal exempt staffs. This paper presents descriptive and linear regression results on staffing expenditures for five years of federal data in Canada. Using the construct of “revealed preference,” predictors of variance in ministerial spending on staffing may provide new, objective information on their function in Canadian government. Results of this study demonstrate that quantitative methods can be applied to the study of political staff and may be a helpful addition as the field continues to develop, test and refine theory
Business · Cabinet (room · Construct (python library · Government (linguistics · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Staffing · Test (biology · Variance (accounting · Accounting · Canadian Policy and Governance · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Engineering · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Public Administration
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Permanent Disadvantage or Gradual Integration
The Politicization of the Civil Service in Comparative Perspective
Appointed political staffs and the diversification of policy advisory sources
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Strategic Links in a Cut‐throat World
Core Executive Studies Two Decades On
Enemy or Ally? Senior Officials’ Perceptions of Ministerial Advisers Before and After MMP
The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-maximizing Bureau
Investment in Human Capital
The Minister's Office Staff
Of secretaries to princes”
The minister's staff
Evolution of the Exchange Control
Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference
Prime Ministers, Presidentialism and Westminster Smokescreens
Models of Executive Politics
Ministers, Minders and the Core Executive
Policy formulation, governance shifts and policy influence
Principal-Agent Models
New Political Governance in Westminster Systems
Revisiting Politicization
Administrative Reform in Public Management
Political Staff in Executive Government
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,43 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2025 (7) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |