Out of the Cabinet
What Drives Defections From the Government in Presidential Systems
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6244397 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, USA), Cecilia Martínez‐gallardo (0000-0002-3700-1037, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 62-90 |
| Publication date | 2012-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Comparative Political Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0010-4140 • E-ISSN: 1552-3829 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0010414011421306 |
| OpenAlex | W2108903247 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 65 |
| References cited | 34 |
This article challenges a key part of the conventional view of coalitions in presidential systems that sees them as short-lived and ad hoc. The author shows instead that there is wide variation in the durability of governing coalitions across these regimes. She develops a theory of the incentives of parties to participate in the government and the circumstances under which scholars might expect to see the existing governing coalition break down. The author draws on data from 121 cabinets in 12 Latin American countries between the late 1980s and the mid-2000s to show that the dissolution of the cabinet is more likely when the president places less value on coalition building as a policy-making strategy and when parties find it costly to participate in the government. In particular, the author shows that strong unilateral institutional powers tend to diminish the incentives of presidents to compromise with other parties; in contrast, effective legislatures and high rates of approval for the executive contribute significantly to more stable governments
Cabinet (room · Compromise · Divided government · Economics · Executive branch · Government (linguistics · Incentive · Law and economics · Legislature · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Public economics · Value (mathematics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Politics and Society in Latin America · Public Administration · Social Policy and Reform Studies
Government Formation and Cabinets
El carácter múltiple de la racionalidad estatal
Presidentes y gabinetes en Argentina (1862-1930)
When Democracies Deliver
Fighting Past Economic Wars
Public support for Latin American presidents
Portfolio Allocation as the President's Calculations
Pre-electoral coalitions and cabinet stability in presidential systems
Bicameralism and Coalition Cabinets in Presidential Polities
Ministerial stability during presidential approval crises
Partisan distribution of ministerial portfolios in Asian-Pacific democracies
La efectividad de las políticas de justicia de la última década en América Latina
Parties and Coalition Governance in Presidential Democracies
A Multilevel Model for Coalition Governments
Line‐item vetoes as a coordination mechanism
The Institutional Presidency in Latin America
Cambios de gabinete y supervivencia de los ministros en Chile durante los gobiernos de la Concertación (1990-2010)
Gaining new insights by going local
Blame Shifting in Presidential Systems
The drivers of resemblance in presidential regimes
Party Systems and Government Stability in Central and Eastern Europe
Party System Polarisation and Government Duration in Central and Eastern Europe
Party System Institutionalization and Government Formation in new Democracies
Designing Cabinets
Oversized Government Coalitions in Latin America
Legislative Effectiveness in Multiparty Presidential Systems
Minister Turnover, Critical Events, and the Electoral Calendar in Presidential Democracies
Why do parties cooperate in presidentialism? Electoral and government coalition formation in Latin America
Executive control of bureaucracy and presidential cabinet appointments in East Asian democracies
When do coalitions form under presidentialism, and why does it matter? A configurational analysis from Latin America
How Do Minority Presidents Manage Multiparty Coalitions? Identifying and Analyzing the Payoffs to Coalition Parties in Presidential Systems
Parties for hire
Electoral incentives to coalition formation in multiparty presidential systems
Policy Monitoring and Ministerial Survival
Congruent We Govern
Presidents, Prime Ministers and Legislative Behaviour
Executive capacity to control legislatures and presidential choice of cabinet ministers in East Asian democracies
Gamson going global? Cabinet proportionality in comparative perspective
Flying solo
A new political system model
Presidential hegemony and democratic backsliding in Latin America, 1925–2016
The Pigmentocracy of Executive Approval
Policy Regimes and Economic Accountability in Latin America
Security, Clarity of Responsibility, and Presidential Approval
Partisan Portfolio Allocation in African Democracies
Inside Revolutionary Parties
Question of Timing
Coalition Presidentialism in Bicameral Congresses
The Institutional Presidency from a Comparative Perspective
Maximizing the Reliability of Cross-National Measures of Presidential Power
Presidents’ Sex and Popularity
The Politics of Minister Retention in Presidential Systems
Sociología política de las elites. Apuntes sobre su abordaje a través de entrevistas
Política Distributiva em Coalizão
Os ciclos do presidencialismo de coalizão e seus determinantes político-econômicos
Razões da Fragmentação
Mensurando e explicando a instabilidade dos gabinetes presidenciais no Brasil entre 1946 e 1964
Todos Os Estados São Iguais, Mas Alguns São Mais Iguais Que Os Outros
Watchdogs in Our Midst
Too Legit to Quit? Analyzing the Effect of No-Confidence Motions on Cabinet Members' Instability in Presidential Systems
Foreign Policy Specificity
The Formation of Cabinet Coalitions in Presidential Systems
How Valuable Is a Presidential Cabinet? Measuring Ministries' Political Attractiveness in Brazil
Informal Coalitions and Legislative Agenda Setting in Mexico's Multiparty Presidential System
Presidentas Rise
How Democracy Works
Parliaments and Coalitions
The Failure of Presidential Democracy
Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies
Public Opinion in America
Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies
Parties and Democracy
Ideological Diversity and Government Survival in Western European Parliamentary Democracies
Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation
How Political Stability Shapes Administrative Performance
The Politics of Coalition Formation and Survival in Multiparty Presidential Democracies
Institutions, Expectations, and Currency Crises
Government survival in Western multi–party democracies
Unified Government, Bill Approval, and the Legislative Weight of the President
Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy
Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America
The Presidential Calculus
Democraticinstitutions Andregimesurvival
Government Termination
Time is of the Essence
The Process of Cabinet Dissolution
A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies
Cabinet Survival and Competing Risks
Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism
Cabinet Instability and the Accumulation of Experience
Modelling Cabinet Durability and Termination
Wasting Time? The Impact of Ideology and Size on Delay in Coalition Formation
The Comparative Analysis of Coalition Formation and Duration
Political Parties and Government Coalitions in the Americas
Incentives to cultivate a personal vote
Tipos de presidencialismo y coaliciones políticas en América Latina
How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies
Minority Presidents and Democratic Performance in Latin America
| Unique citing works | 65 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,64 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2026 (15) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 65 |