Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in the Former Communist Countries
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6245224 |
|---|---|
| Authors | George Tsebelis (0000-0003-0889-8153, University of California, Los Angeles), Tatiana P Rizova (University of California, Los Angeles) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 40 |
| Issue | 10 |
| Pages | 1155-1182 |
| Publication date | 2007-10-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Comparative Political Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0010-4140 • E-ISSN: 1552-3829 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0010414006288979 |
| OpenAlex | W2096830836 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
| References cited | 18 |
Nine out of 27 presidents in the former communist world have the power to amend vetoed legislation. These presidential powers in the former Soviet Bloc have not been given adequate attention in the comparative politics literature. The authors analyze veto procedures in the excommunist region (27 countries) and argue that amendatory veto power enhances presidential powers in legislative decision making. The findings are particularly important in light of the fact that one of the goals of constitutional design in the former communist world was to curtail rather than boost presidential authority
Communism · Economics · Law and economics · Legislation · Legislature · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Presidential system · Veto · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · European Union Policy and Governance · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Public Administration
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Presidents and Assemblies
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Veto Players
Pivotal Politics
The Origins of Presidential Conditional Agenda-Setting Power in Latin America
The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter
Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America
Measuring Presidential Power
A Politics of Institutional Choice
The Ukrainian Orange Revolution brought more than a new president
The Core of the Constitution
Ukraine's Orange Revolution
| Citations per year | 0.67 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2008 - 2025 (18) |
| Highly cited | No |