Transparency, Elections, and Pakistani Politicians’ Tax Compliance
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6246201 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rabia Malik (0000-0002-7661-2578, New York University Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 7 |
| Pages | 1060-1091 |
| Publication date | 2020-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Comparative Political Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0010-4140 • E-ISSN: 1552-3829 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0010414019879964 |
| OpenAlex | W2982281580 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 28 |
A growing literature on political accountability focuses on the extent to which voters electorally punish politicians when provided with credible negative information about politicians’ actions. Whether politicians respond to information provision by changing their behavior—thus appearing accountable to voters—is an integral part of this puzzle but has received comparatively little attention. I address this gap by exploiting an unforeseen decision by the Pakistani government to publicly release legislators’ past income tax payments, and measure the effect of the information provision on their tax payments in the following year. Using new data on politicians’ asset ownership and tax payments in a difference-in-differences research design, I provide strong evidence that the pressure to decrease tax evasion was highest for competitively and directly elected legislators. These heterogeneous effects are not explained by differences between legislators or electoral constituencies, supporting the hypothesis that electoral incentives condition legislator responsiveness to information shocks
Accountability · Asset (computer security · Business · Compliance (psychology · Economics · Government (linguistics · Incentive · Legislation · Legislator · Market economy · Payment · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Transparency (behavior · Accounting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Finance · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Taxation and Compliance Studies
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| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |