Economic Origins of Electoral Support for Authoritarian Successors

A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting in New Democracies

Bibliographic Data

ID6246743
AuthorsByong-Kuen Jhee (Korea University, Seoul), Byong‐kuen Jhee (Korea University, corresponding author)
Year2008
Volume41
Issue3
Pages362-388
Publication date2008-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueComparative Political Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0010-4140 • E-ISSN: 1552-3829
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0010414007300694
OpenAlexW2116378719
LanguageEN
Citations received15
References cited28

This study explores how economic performance prior to democratic transitions affects the fate of successors to authoritarian rulers in new democracies. It investigates 70 founding election outcomes, finding that successful economic performance under an authoritarian regime increases the vote share of successors. It also finds that the past economic performance of authoritarian rulers decreases the likelihood of government alternation to democratic oppositions. Interim governments that initiate democratic transition, however, are neither blamed nor rewarded for economic conditions during transition periods. This study concludes that electorates are not myopic and that economic voting is not a knee-jerk reaction to short-term economic performance in new democracies

Authoritarianism · Democracy · Economic system · Economics · Government (linguistics · Interim · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Religion and Society Interactions

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