The Lesser Evil? Corruption Voting and the Importance of Clean Alternatives

Bibliographic Data

ID6246768
AuthorsMattias Agerberg (0000-0001-7813-6109, University of Gothenburg, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume53
Issue2
Pages253-287
Publication date2020-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueComparative Political Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0010-4140 • E-ISSN: 1552-3829
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0010414019852697
OpenAlexW2952673482
LanguageEN
Citations received39
References cited58

Surveys show that citizens in all parts of the world have a strong distaste for corruption. At the same time, and contrary to the predictions of democratic theory, politicians involved in the most glaring abuse of public office often continue to receive electoral support. Using an original survey experiment conducted in Spain, this article explores a previously understudied aspect of this apparent paradox: the importance of viable and clean political alternatives. The results suggest that voters do punish political corruption when a clean alternative exists, even when the corrupt candidate is very appealing in other respects. However, when only given corrupt alternatives, respondents become much more likely to tolerate a candidate accused of corruption—even when given a convenient “no-choice” option. I discuss how these results can help us understand corruption voting and why some societies seem to be stuck in a high-corruption equilibrium

Democracy · Economics · Language change · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Voting · Corruption and Economic Development · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law

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