Political corruption and voting in Romanian municipal elections

Why perceptions of collective action matter

Bibliographic Data

ID11891765
AuthorsNicholas Charron (0000-0003-0310-1547, University of Gothenburg, corresponding author), Andreas Bågenholm (University of Gothenburg)
Year2025
Pages1-21
Publication date2025-11-10
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Journal of Political Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0304-4130 • E-ISSN: 1475-6765
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1017/s1475676525100352
OpenAlexW7104581567
LanguageEN
References cited68

In recent years, scholars have investigated the ‘corruption voting puzzle’, ie why, despite an overwhelming distaste for corruption, voters often collectively fail to ‘throw the rascals out’. While previous literature has largely investigated why voters support corrupt incumbents, our focus lies on nonvoters. Using an original two-wave panel data with Romanian voters just prior to and after the 2020 municipal elections, we test three hypotheses. First, that there is a discrepancy between voters’ intentions and their actual voting behavior (e.g. ‘norms versus actions’). Second, that those most pessimistic about other voters’ intentions to come out to the polls to vote out corrupt incumbents are most likely to abstain. Finally, building on the collective action literature, whether providing such pessimistic voters with information about the intentions of other voters will decrease abstention and increase opposition voting. Using original observational and experimental data, we demonstrate empirical support for our three hypotheses

Collective action · Opposition (politics · Perception · Pessimism · Politics · Romanian · Voting · Voting behavior · Benford’s Law and Fraud Detection · Corruption and Economic Development · Electoral Systems and Political Participation

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