Constitutional Change in Colombia

Policy Adjustment Through Institutional Reform

Bibliographic Data

ID6246796
AuthorsDaniel L Nielson (0000-0002-0279-0494, Brigham Young University), Matthew Soberg Shugart (0000-0002-6144-8613, University of California San Diego)
Year1999
Volume32
Issue3
Pages313-341
Publication date1999-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueComparative Political Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0010-4140 • E-ISSN: 1552-3829
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0010414099032003002
OpenAlexW2077276401
LanguageEN
Citations received29
References cited29

By the late 1980s the Colombian constitution had come under severe pressure for reform as the population shifted markedly from a rural to an urban majority. The president had repeatedly tried to provide policy to court the median Colombian voter, who was urban. The congress was strongly tied to rural interests. Congress consistently thwarted presidential efforts at policy reform. Different presidents again and again proposed constitutional reform as a way of achieving eventual policy aims, only to have the proposed reforms soundly rejected in the legislature. The Colombian congress solely possessed the authority to make constitutional revisions. This article tells the story of how this institutional impasse was overcome. In the wake of severe social strife and conflict a national referendum on constitutional reform was passed by popular vote and upheld by judicial action. This article argues that such constitutional conflict might only be overcome through extraconstitutional—although still democratic—means

Constitution · Constitutional amendment · Constitutional court · Democracy · Legislature · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Population · Presidential system · Referendum · Sociology · Comparative constitutional jurisprudence studies · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Politics and Society in Latin America · Public Administration

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