Institutions as Signals
How Dictators Consolidate Power in Times of Crisis
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6247601 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Joan C Timoneda (0000-0001-7057-872X, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 49-68 |
| Publication date | 2020-10-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Comparative Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0010-4159 • E-ISSN: 2151-6227 |
| Publisher | Comparative Politics CUNY (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.5129/001041520x15815281661634 |
| OpenAlex | W3010471687 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
Formal institutions in dictatorship are known to improve authoritarian governance and promote power-sharing. Yet institutions also act as tools of information propagation and can be used by autocrats for signaling purposes. In this article, I argue that in times of weakness, dictators follow an expand-and-signal strategy, expanding the ruling coalition to decrease the relative power of coup plotters and then create visible formal institutions to signal strong support. Doing so decreases (1) the probability that a coup is launched and (2) that one succeeds if staged. I propose a formal model to unpack the mechanisms of my argument and use the case of the Dominican Republic during Rafael Trujillo's rule to illustrate my theory
Argument (complex analysis · Authoritarianism · Clientelism · Corporate governance · Democracy · Dictatorship · Economic system · Economics · Law and economics · Management · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Power sharing · Sociology · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Society in Latin America
The Road to Repression
Authoritarian Survival and Leadership Succession in North Korea and Beyond
Political leadership, preference disclosure, and regulatory behavior
Strong elites, weak resistance
Too Many to Fight
Carrots and Sticks of Authoritarian Federalism
Et Tu, Brute? Wealth Inequality and the Political Economy of Authoritarian Replacement
The trajectories of personalization
Authoritarian Information Gathering amid Crisis
The Rush to Personalize
| Citations per year | 3.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Highly cited | No |