The place of unreasonable people beyond Rawls

Bibliographic Data

ID6259976
AuthorsRoberta Sala (0000-0002-3558-542X, University Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan, Italy, corresponding author)
Year2013
Volume12
Issue3
Pages253-270
Publication date2013-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Journal of Political Theory (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1474-8851 • E-ISSN: 1741-2730
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1474885112465248
OpenAlexW1972142271
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited12

In this article I look for an alternative way in which ‘unreasonable’ people may be included in a liberal society. Differing from Rawls, whose reasonable hope is for unreasonable people gradually to adhere to liberal institutions so that, over time, an overlapping consensus is reached, I propose the alternative way of them supporting these institutions as a special modus vivendi, which does not require them to renounce their non-reasonableness. First I detail the Rawlsian notion of reasonableness and unreasonableness; second, I discuss how the treatment of the unreasonable is addressed by Rawls; third, taking inspiration from two accounts of how to consider the ‘unreasonable’ within a liberal society, I maintain that a subset of ‘unreasonable’ (I call them ‘non-reasonable’) may be included in public debate; fourth, I propose that their way of inclusion is a stable modus vivendi

Classical liberalism · Democracy · Inclusion (mineral · Just society · Law and economics · Liberalism · Political science · Politics · Public reason · Social science · Sociology · Critical Theory and Philosophy · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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