Control from the core? The impact of cabinet committees on ministers’ legislative activity
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6260643 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Peter Heyn Nielsen (0000-0001-8809-3157, University of Oxford, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 281-297 |
| Publication date | 2024-05-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1755-7739 • E-ISSN: 1755-7747 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s1755773923000310 |
| OpenAlex | W4388292693 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 59 |
Ministers may be powerful policy initiators, but they are not equally powerful. Cabinet control mechanisms have become a crucial part of cabinet governance, which can serve to contain agency loss and consequently constrain ministers in the policymaking process. However, empirical studies have not focused on the impact of such control mechanisms on individual ministers’ political outcomes. I turn attention to certain cabinet committees as intra-cabinet control mechanisms and argue that members of these enjoy a policymaking advantage compared to nonmembers. Analyzing ministers’ number of laws proposed to parliament in Denmark from 1975 to 2022, I look beyond parties as unitary actors and provide evidence for this causal relationship. Membership of the Economic Committee increases ministers’ legislative activity. Thus, even within parties in cabinet, ministers have unequal possibilities to act as policy-seeking. These findings offer new insights into political parties in governments, cabinet governance, policymaking, and legislative processes
Cabinet (room · Control (management · Core (optical fiber · Economics · Legislature · Management · Political science · Telecommunications · Computer Science · Engineering · Law · Political and Economic history of UK and US · Political Systems and Governance · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
Making and Breaking Governments
Duopoly, court politics and the Danish core executive
With a little help from my friends
Inter-Party Conflict Management in Coalition Governments
Coalition Governance and Foreign Policy Decision-Making
Cabinet committees as strategies of prime ministerial leadership in Canada, 2003–2019
Prime Ministerial Predominance? Core Executive Politics in the UK
Meeting the Challenges of Representation and Accountability in Multi-party Governments
The Political Dynamics of Portfolio Design in European Democracies
Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in the Cabinet
From bureaucratic capacity to legislation
Marx’ or the Market? Intra-party Power and Social Democratic Welfare State Retrenchment
Stability through control? The influence of coalition agreements on the stability of coalition cabinets
Public popularity as a part of the job description? Dismissing unpopular ministers
Coalition agreements and governments’ policy-making productivity
Stability of minority governments and the role of support agreements
Coalition Governance with Incomplete Information
Multiparty Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Public Spending
The Eyes that Bind
Keeping tabs through collaboration? Sharing ministerial responsibility in coalition governments
The Agenda-Setting Power of the Prime Minister Party in Coalition Governments
Government Agenda-Setting and Bicameral Conflict Resolution
Coalition agreement and party mandate
Legislative pledges and coalition government
Minority governments and legislative reliability
Political Dynasties and the Selection of Cabinet Ministers
Cabinet Composition, Collegiality, and Collectivity
Government dominance and the role of opposition in parliamentary democracies
Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies
Making words count
Duty calls but not for all
Portfolio allocation patterns and policy‐making effectiveness in minority coalition governments
Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministers
The checks and balances of party federalism
Ideologues, Partisans, and Loyalists
Ministerial Autonomy, Parliamentary Scrutiny and Government Reform Output in Parliamentary Democracies
Effects of the Core Functions of Government on the Diversity of Executive Agendas
Wary Partners
Constraining Ministerial Power
Shadowing Ministers
Coalition Government, Legislative Institutions, and Public Policy in Parliamentary Democracies
Keeping Tabs on Partners
Policing the Bargain
The Government Agenda in Parliamentary Democracies
The Declining Talent Pool of Government
Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism
Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift
Coalitions and Cabinet Government
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |