Delegation without Agency Loss? The Use of Performance Contracts in Danish Central Government
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6263939 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz (0000-0002-5059-0251, Aarhus University), Jørgen Grønnegaard Christensen (Aarhus University) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 263-293 |
| Publication date | 2009-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Governance (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0952-1895 • E-ISSN: 1468-0491 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0491.2009.01435.x |
| OpenAlex | W2119209612 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 26 |
Performance contracts entered between ministerial departments and their agencies are used throughout the Danish central government. The article analyzes the use of performance contracting in 2005. The analysis draws on transaction cost theory and actor‐centered institutionalism, stressing the bargaining aspect of hierarchy and the importance of economic and political transaction costs. The analysis shows considerable variation in the content of performance demands. Ministries with different organizational designs use contracts in markedly different ways and agencies with a strong interface to individual citizens and businesses are more likely to meet demands regulating policy delivery and service levels. Further, contracts contain substantive clauses, the terms of which are largely assessable. It also shows that performance contracts only rarely specify demands related to cost efficiency within agencies. Many of these results are statistically significant, even though a general point is the wide variation in the implementation of performance contracts between individual ministries
Agency (philosophy · Business · Contracting out · Corporate governance · Danish · Database transaction · Delegation · Economics · Government (linguistics · Hierarchy · Industrial organization · Management · Market economy · Operations management · Political science · Politics · Principal–agent problem · Public economics · Service (business · Sociology · Transaction cost · Variation (astronomy · European Union Policy and Governance · Law · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Social Policy and Reform Studies · Finance · Marketing
Autonomy and managerial reforms in Europe
The interaction of administrative tradition and organisational characteristics
Non‐majoritarian institutions, media coverage, and “reinforced accountability
Explaining the Accountability of Independent Agencies
Performance Management, Managerial Authority, and Public Service Performance
Agency Performance and Executive Pay in Government
Politicization and the Replacement of Top Civil Servants inDenmark
Bureaucratic dilemmas
Situational Contracting
The Political Economy of Public Administration
Autonomy and Regulation
The Engines of European Integration
Deliberate Discretion?
Delegating Powers
The Making of Economic Policy
Games Real Actors Play
Public and private bureaucracies
Exploring Contracts as Reinvented Institutions in the Danish Public Sector
New public management in Germany
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
Power and Political Institutions
Why Politics is More Fundamental Than Economics
Governing Danish Agencies by Contract
Above Politics
Interpreting Administrative Change
Similar Ends, Differing Means
Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies
The New Economics of Organization
Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.6 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2024 (14) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |