Agency Performance and Executive Pay in Government
An Empirical Test
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6295026 |
|---|---|
| Authors | A S Binderkrantz (Aarhus University, corresponding author), J G Christensen (Aarhus University) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 31-54 |
| Publication date | 2012-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1053-1858 • E-ISSN: 1477-9803 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/jopart/mur039 |
| OpenAlex | W2329875962 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 36 |
Public management reform has drawn inspiration from principal agent theory and private management, and a favored reform strategy has been civil service reform that strongly recommends pay-for-performance. The hypothesis tested in this paper is that the incentive effect will improve public sector management. The basis is the performance management system introduced in Danish central government where access to both performance and pay data provides us with unique behavioral data. The system combines performance contracts with executive contracts for agency heads, who in this way can earn a bonus based on agency performance. We find no support for the hypothesis and discuss the result against principal agent theory, private sector experience, and bureaucratic theory. Reforma en la gerencia pública ha extraído tanto de la Teoría Agente-Principal como de la gerencia privada y una de las estrategias favorecidas ha sido la reforma del servicio civil la cual recomienda fuertemente remuneración según el desempeño. La hipótesis analizada en este artículo es que el efecto del incentivo mejorara la gerencia en el sector público. La base del estudio es el sistema de gerencia de desempeño introducido en el gobierno central Danés el cual nos proporcionó acceso a datos de desempeño y remuneraciones junto con datos únicos de comportamiento. El sistema combina contratos de desempeño con contratos gerenciales de los directores de entidades quienes devengan un bono dependido del desempeño de la entidad. No encontramos respaldo para la hipótesis y discutimos los resultados en contra de la Teoría Agente-Principal, experiencia en el sector privado y la teoría burocrática. Translations by Claudia N. Avellaneda, University of North Carolina Charlotte and Nicolai Petrovsky, University of Kentucky
Agency (philosophy · Bureaucracy · Business · Civil service · Computer security · Economics · Government (linguistics · Management · New public management · Political science · Politics · Principal (computer security · Principal–agent problem · Private sector · Public sector · Public service · Sociology · Welfare economics · Accounting and Organizational Management · Computer Science · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Policy and Administration Research · Law · Public Administration
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Struggling With Ambiguity
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
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The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
Of Pigs in Pokes and Policy Diffusion
Trust and Incentives in Principal-Agent Negotiations
Governing Danish Agencies by Contract
Incentives for Dentists in Public Service
Results-Model Reform Leadership
The Principal's Moral Hazard
Performance Regimes Amidst Governance Complexity
Above Politics
Comparing Public and Private Organizations
Pay for Performance in the Public Sector--Benefits and (Hidden) Costs
Testing How Management Matters in an Era of Government by Performance Management
Business Models and the Transfer of Businesslike CentralGovernment Agencies
Similar Ends, Differing Means
Delegation without Agency Loss? The Use of Performance Contracts in Danish Central Government
The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.75 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2025 (12) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |