Appropriateness and Consequences

The Logic of Neo-Institutionalism

Bibliographic Data

ID6264444
AuthorsKjell Goldmann (Stockholm University, corresponding author)
Year2005
Volume18
Issue1
Pages35-52
Publication date2005-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueGovernance (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0952-1895 • E-ISSN: 1468-0491
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0491.2004.00265.x
OpenAlexW1975045410
LanguageEN
Citations received44
References cited22

Skeptical questions may be raised about the neo-institutionalist approach of James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, in which a "logic of expected consequences" is set against a "logic of appropriateness": (1) it is difficult to determine what kind of constructs the so-called logics are—whether they are to be seen as perspectives, theories, or ideal types; (2) the logics, far from being mutually excluding, overlap very considerably; (3) analytical utility is debatable not only in the case of the "logic of expected consequences" but also when it is a matter of the "logic of appropriateness"; (4) the normative virtue of substituting a "logic of appropriateness" for a "logic of expected consequences" is less obvious than March and Olsen's readers may be led to think. It is tempting to conclude that March and Olsen's approach has proven compelling because of its consequences for the scholarly community rather than by virtue of its analytical appropriateness

Economics · Epistemology · Ideal (ethics · Normative · Positive economics · Set (abstract data type · Skepticism · Sociology · Virtue · Computer Science · Corruption and Economic Development · Economic Theory and Institutions · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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