The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy Anchors
Firm-Level Evidence
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6268722 |
|---|---|
| Autores | J Lawrence Broz (0000-0002-3866-1336), Michael Plouffe (0000-0002-7178-4039) |
| Año | 2010 |
| Volumen | 64 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 695-717 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2010-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | International Organization (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0020-8183 • E-ISSN: 1531-5088 |
| Editorial | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0020818310000196 |
| OpenAlex | W2163199172 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 5 |
| Referencias citadas | 36 |
Analyses of monetary policy posit that exchange-rate pegs, inflation targets, and central bank independence can help anchor private-sector inflation expectations. Yet there are few direct tests of this argument. We offer cross-national, micro-level evidence on the effectiveness of monetary anchors in controlling private-sector inflation concerns. Using firm-level data from eighty-one countries (approximately 10,000 firms), we find evidence that “international” anchors (exchange-rate commitments) correlate significantly with a substantial reduction in private-sector concerns about inflation while “domestic” anchors (inflation targeting and central bank independence) do not. Our conjecture is that private-sector inflation expectations are more responsive to exchange-rate anchors because they are more transparent, more constraining, and more costly than domestic anchoring arrangements
Argument (complex analysis · Central bank · Economic growth · Economics · Exchange rate · Independence (probability theory · Inflation (cosmology · Inflation targeting · International economics · Macroeconomics · Monetary economics · Monetary policy · Private sector · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
The evolution of central banks
Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes
The advantage of tying one's hands
Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance
The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements
Clarify
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Survey Measures of Expected U.S. Inflation
On the credibility of alternative exchange rate regimes
Variation in central bank independence across countries
Rules Rather than Discretion
A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model
Kicking the Habit
The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions
Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes
Inflation Targeting
The Evolution of Central Bank Governance around the World
The Limits of Delegation
Globalization Pressures and the State
| Obras citantes distintas | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,26 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2007 - 2022 (16) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 4 |