Free Riding and Protection for Sale1
Free Riding and Protection for Sale
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6274887 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kishore Gawande (0000-0002-2331-2512, Mitchell Institute), Christopher Magee (0000-0003-2622-4005, Bucknell University) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 735-747 |
| Publication date | 2012-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-8833 • E-ISSN: 1468-2478 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00745.x |
| OpenAlex | W2058701372 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 41 |
Olson hypothesized that a latent group's ability to organize and contribute toward providing a public good might be jeopardized by free riding. The politics of trade protection feature the collective action problem, since protection benefits all firms in the industry including those who contributed nothing to attaining it. This paper examines the extent of free riding in lobbying over tariffs in the context of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) protection-for-sale model in which industry lobbies seek to bend government policy in their favor. Previous investigations of the model have produced the puzzling result that governments are largely welfare-maximizing and care little about campaign contributions, in contrast to numerous examples of welfare-reducing policies that have in fact been bought cheaply by special interests. We think the result arises because the model assumes away free riding by firms which hinders industry's ability to organize politically. We introduce free riding into the Grossman–Helpman model, allowing industries to be partially organized. Using a new data set on US trade barriers, we test the model using estimation methods new to this literature. The estimates support the model's predictions and reveal that the extent of free riding by manufacturing firms can help resolve the puzzling result
Business · Economics · Free riding · Microeconomics · European and International Contract Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Law, logistics, and international trade
The political economy of U.S. import policy
Measurement Error Models
Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
Instrumental quantile regression inference for structural and treatment effect models
Instrumental variable quantile regression
Interest groups
Protection for Sale
Black hole tariffs and endogenous policy theory
The Rise and Decline of Nations
The Logic of Collective Action
Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection
Import Demand Elasticities and Trade Distortions
“Protection for Sale” in a Developing Country
Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics
Estimating Trade Restrictiveness Indices
The Tariff and the Lobbyist
Collective Action, Pluralism, and the Legitimacy Tariff
On the Rise and Decline of Nations
Lobbying as a Private Good with Intra-Industry Trade
Market Structure, Electoral Institutions, and Trade Policy
Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States
The Logic of Private and Collective Action
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,3 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2020 (5) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |