The Unlikely Survival of Erdoğan in Turkey's May 2023 Elections

Approaching the May 2023 Turkish presidential and assembly elections seemed to promise a challenging situation for the incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). The significant influx of refugees since the onset of the Syrian civil war introduced a reactive public agenda marked by occasional violent clashes in neighbourhoods with high refugee populations. This eventually spilled over to the national political agenda. A new political party, the Victory Party (Zafer Partisi, ZP), emerged with an anti-Syrian sentiment platform, gaining traction amongst young voters and expanding its electoral appeal. After the 2018 elections, the opposition parties united under the Nation Alliance (Millet İttifakı, MI), bringing together social democrats, liberals, nationalists and pro-Islamist conservatives to broaden the opposition's appeal and resistance to the ruling AKP. Additionally, the Erdoğan government's policy performance was also deteriorating. The economy deteriorated due to the President's reliance on strict monetary controls and disregard for market dynamics, leading to a depreciating national currency. The opposition's control of the largest cities since 2019 limited the cabinet's ability to regulate projects and manage clientelist networks. The resulting insecurity and vulnerability tarnished the government's image as a stability and good governance provider. The twin earthquakes on 6 February, 3 months before the elections, exacerbated the administration's failure to respond effectively to the disaster. The affected southeastern provinces, home to nearly 10% of the population, suffered extensive loss of life and infrastructure damage. The AKP's 21-year rule seemed to be ending due to poor performance in economics and democratic governance, leading to a potential electoral defeat. However, Erdoğan won the presidency in the second round, and his People's Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı, CI) secured a comfortable margin for controlling the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM).1 The question remains: what factors contributed to Erdoğan's remarkable survival against all odds? Who were Erdoğan's supporters, and on what issue bases did they cast their votes for him?2 I examine the factors contributing to Erdoğan's re-election using individual-level post-election data and I argue that his success was primarily based on his performance in various policy areas, such as protecting moral values and easing the use of turban in public spaces, as well as his handling of security and foreign policy. However, his performance in other areas, such as resolving the Kurdish problem, reducing inflation, providing economic welfare and addressing the LGBTQ community's demands, was perceived as relatively low. This duality in his performance allowed him to strategically shift the agenda in favour of more advantageous issue areas, which were favoured by large nationalist and pro-Islamist constituencies. By successfully positioning himself on these key issues, Erdoğan secured a considerable electoral gain. Optimistic prospective rather than retrospective pocketbook evaluations and support from low-educated middle-to-older age groups, right-wing voters and those who are not problematized by the state of Turkish governance all significantly contributed to Erdoğan's support. However, ethnic and sectarian minority groups, such as Kurds and Alevis, were negatively predisposed to voting for him. The misinformation campaign against the opposition appears to be ineffective in shaping the Erdoğan vote. Turkey has been designated as a candidate for EU membership, but its accession negotiations have been halted since 2018 on account of worries about the rule of law and democratic values. The two election candidates cannot be easily categorized as pro- or anti-EU. Although Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the opposition candidate, was hesitant towards the EU, he promised to regain trust in Western allies, which was unprecedentedly low. Erdoğan's broader alliance now comprises partners with more conservative right-wing and pro-Islamist viewpoints, further constraining his capacity to adopt a more Western-oriented foreign policy approach. Erdoğan's eventual victory reinforces his control over Turkish politics, which does not bode well for enhancing Western relations.3 The 2018 elections sparked speculation about an early election in the country. The economic crisis, which significantly depreciated the Turkish lira against the US dollar, further fuelled this expectation. However, the politicization of the financial crisis is mainly due to the AKP candidates' significant losses in the 2019 local elections. This gave new momentum to the opposition and provided potential challengers to Erdoğan's electoral dominance. The 2019 local elections resulted in significant losses for the incumbent CI in major metropolitan areas like Istanbul and Ankara, which had been under conservative control since the mid-1990s.4 Furthermore, the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), and independent candidates secured victories in coastal municipalities across the Aegean, Thrace and Mediterranean regions. Although the CI maintained a dominant electoral appeal, securing over 50% of the votes for municipal council and mayoral elections nationwide, they lost control of the largest metropolitan centres. Due to the fragmented support for opposition parties, an alliance was seen as the only viable option for the 2023 elections. The opposition vote base grew in 2018 when the Good Party (İyi Parti, IYIP) entered the electoral scene after splitting from the MHP, attracting centrist AKP supporters who were disenchanted with the party. Although the IYIP held only five seats in the TBMM, CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu helped by loaning 15 CHP representatives. This allowed IYIP to form a parliamentary group and avoid collecting signatures for their party leader, Meral Akşener, to run against Erdoğan in the presidential election. The IYIP joined the MI with the CHP, SP and DP in the TBMM elections, securing 9.96% of the vote, whilst Akşener garnered 7.3% (Table 1). The opposition alliance attracted conservative voters away from the AKP-MHP, with many choosing the more centrist IYIP and other right-of-centre parties like the pro-Islamist SP. As the 2023 elections approached, new opportunities arose to expand MI further. Two influential figures from the AKP, the former foreign affairs minister and prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and the former foreign affairs minister and deputy prime minister responsible for the economy Ali Babacan, each established their own political parties, the Future Party (Gelecek Partisi, GP) and the Democracy and Progress Party (Demokrasi ve Atılım Partisi, DevaP), respectfully. These high-profile exits from the AKP were interpreted as a sign that disenchanted AKP supporters could be courted. Ultimately, both GP and DevaP joined the MI, forming a so-called 'six-legged table' comprising three splinter parties from AKP and MHP—IYIP, GP and Deva—one pro-Islamist SP, one minor centre-right DP and the main opposition social-democratic CHP. MI's main promise was a return to a fortified parliamentary system, dismantling Erdoğan's presidential system. A long and detailed list of policy promises primarily focused on a rational economic policy and reformed merit-based public sector.5 Kurdish voters' support was also crucial, given the expectation of a close presidential race in 2023. The Kurdish vote already held significant weight with many parliamentarians in the TBMM. The Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (Halkların Eşitlik ve Demokrasi Partisi, DEMP) decided after lengthy negotiations and the Labor and Freedom Alliance's inner deliberation against fielding a separate presidential candidate, as this individual would have no chance of triumphing over the other major contenders. In this context, the implied support of the DEMP could be instrumental in determining the election's eventual winner. However, given the nationalist sensitivities and ties of the Kurdish parties with the Kurdish Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK), considered a terrorist organization by the Turkish state, the United States and the EU amongst other states, any covert or direct appeal via the political parties and their representatives in the TBMM carried considerable political risks that could backfire amongst certain electoral constituencies. Despite the Constitutional Court's threat of closure of the Peoples' Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP), the party refused to sever any ties with the PKK. The MI argued that the HDP should be treated like any other legal party and engaged in official or unofficial talks with them. The AKP-MHP campaign, which continued to associate the HDP with the PKK, deterred the MI, particularly the IYIP leadership, from further engaging with the HDP. Although the opposition united against Erdoğan's candidacy in 2023, this unity did not last throughout the campaign. The internal disagreements within the opposition alliance significantly aided Erdoğan's success in the 2023 elections. Opposition leadership competition garnered attention equal to economic crises and natural disasters. The opposition could not easily identify a presidential candidate. Negotiations for the alliance's presidential candidate collapsed a month after the earthquake (see Baruh and Çarkoğlu, 2024). IYIP, the second-largest party in the alliance, expressed dissatisfaction with choosing a winning candidate for the upcoming presidential election. They argued that Kılıçdaroğlu would not secure the presidency if nominated and advocated finding an alternative candidate, suggesting the names of Istanbul and Ankara's metropolitan mayors. Both mayors, CHP members, hesitated to challenge their party leader. The opposition alliance's chances improved with the addition of Ankara and Istanbul's mayors as Kılıçdaroğlu's running mates. However, the alliance's co-operative and competitive dynamics were severely damaged, ultimately hindering a successful campaign. The economic crisis after the 2018 elections was predicted to cause an early election before the crisis's full impact hit. Turkey's economy rebounded strongly after COVID-19, with 5.6% growth in 2022, down from 11.4% in 2021. Exports, investment and manufacturing activities all lost momentum, and the deteriorating external environment and heterodox monetary policies caused the economy to slow down. Despite the central bank's estimated intervention of $108 billion, the Turkish lira fell by 30% in 2022.6 Inflation, which was 20.3% in 2018, escalated to 64% by 2022. Despite the economy's negative impact on the incumbent CI and Erdoğan's electoral chances, the opposition MI's internal issues were the main focus. A major natural disaster disrupted the election agenda, diverting the nation's focus from the incumbent's shortcomings and concentrating more on pressing survival issues. On 6 February, 2023, two major earthquakes significantly impacted 11 provinces, affecting approximately 16.4% of the population and 9.4% of the economy. Direct losses from earthquakes amounted to $34.2 billion, and reconstruction needs could double that amount. Earthquakes exacerbated the delicate macro-financial landscape. The World Bank acknowledged that pre-election spending and reconstruction efforts could promote growth, which is projected to exceed 3% by the end of 2023.7 Indeed, the country's overall GDP growth was 4.5% in 2023. Despite the economic difficulties, the incumbent Erdoğan maintained control over the reconstruction efforts. He used the earthquake's aftermath to regain credibility by providing economic relief, especially as the election neared. Last-minute wage increases and early retirement proposals were implemented to attract key voter groups.8 Erdoğan's campaign relied heavily on his ability to control the media. Turkey ranked 165th out of 180 countries in 2023 in the World Press Freedom Index, dropping from 100th in 2002.9 As such, the country is a typical example of competitive authoritarian regimes that allow for some competition and limited information access in the electoral sphere. However, in these closely orchestrated elections, the cards appeared stacked to favour the incumbent's continued rule (Bermeo, 2016). Independent journalism in these regimes is severely constrained. Media outlets face pressure through arrests, assaults, threats, fines and censorship. Websites and social media platforms are also targeted by trolls. Pro-regime media bias towards favourable coverage of the ruling party leads to a significant disparity in information access for voters (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Opposition's media coverage in May 2023 was limited compared to the ruling alliance and its candidate.10 Erdoğan's messages aimed to distance him from the opposing side, polarizing both ideologically and affectively to bolster nationalist conservative support. Whilst ideological polarization may be providing voters with clear choices (Barber and McCarty, 2015), the growth of social distancing, animosity and incivility amongst political factions is damaging to a healthy democracy. Affective polarization erodes trust, impedes co-operation and leads to discriminatory behaviour towards opposing partisans outside the political sphere (Iyengar et al., 2019). Wagner (2021) ranked Turkey as one of the countries with the highest levels of affective polarization worldwide. Erdoğan's discourse provides clear reasons for escalating affective polarization in Turkey. Often, he claimed the opposition worked with the PKK separatists. Erdoğan claimed during a Konya rally that the opposition follows PKK's Kandil leadership whilst his People's Alliance obeys God's instructions.11 He presented a fabricated video of Murat Karayilan, a co-founder of the PKK, endorsing Kılıçdaroğlu in a rally to prove alleged collaboration. Erdogan's claim of opposition being anti-Islamic and pro-LGBTQ sparked conservative Islamist sentiments.12 Although the EU did not occupy a significant space in the election campaign, Erdoğan claimed Kılıçdaroğlu to be a 'puppet of the West' to complement his portrayal of him as an unpatriotic collaborator with Turkey's nemeses.13 The opposition has similarly spread false information to stereotype refugees and migrants negatively. Kılıçdaroğlu adopted a nationalistic tone in the second round to appeal to voters influenced by Erdoğan's forceful campaign, accusing Erdoğan of bringing 10 million refugees into Turkey and committing himself to returning the Syrians back to Syria if elected. However, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reports that the actual number of refugees in the country is approximately 4 million.14 Although both sides used these misinformation messages, it is unclear to what extent different party constituencies found them convincing. Polarized opinions on both ends have intensified the deep rifts surrounding the nature of Turkey's political institutions. One group believes that Turkey is an autocratic regime with oppressive policies, biased media and unfair election practices. The other group sees Turkey as a thriving democracy with considerable influence in global politics. Consequently, the level of satisfaction with the current political system is anticipated to have a varying impact on voter preferences in the upcoming presidential election. In the first round of the presidential election, the sitting President, Erdoğan, and the opposition CHP's candidate, Kılıçdaroğlu, competed against Muharrem İnce, who was the MI candidate in the 2018 election, and Sinan Oğan, a former MHP parliamentarian (see Table 1). İnce's campaign aimed at the opposition rather than the incumbent alliance. He withdrew from the competition 3 days before the election day due to claims regarding his financial status and personal life. The late withdrawal resulted in over 230,000 votes being wasted as his name remained on the ballots. Oğan was part of the Ancestral Alliance (Ata İttifakı, AtaI), a nationalist-conservative group with the ZP and Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP). He received over 2.8 million votes (5.2%) and backed Erdoğan in the second round, causing the alliance to disband. The initial round of the presidential election yielded a turnout rate of 87.04%. Turnout was notably higher in the western provinces. The low voter turnout in East and Southeast Anatolia, where most Kurdish voters supporting the opposition candidate resided, that low turnout in these mainly the The turnout in the second round was approximately three In the second round, Kılıçdaroğlu his votes but remained million votes The turnout in and southeastern was the opposition's The vote received by Erdoğan in the 2023 elections in the second was nearly to the he received in the 2018 elections Kılıçdaroğlu a in the first round of 2023 compared to the MI candidate Muharrem in 2018 This that a considerable number of who for HDP candidate and IYIP candidate Akşener in 2018 have their support to Kılıçdaroğlu in 2023, the opposition votes his Sinan of Erdoğan may have the in Erdoğan's However, the of after ZP and both of the opposition candidate Kılıçdaroğlu that Oğan may not be in control of his supporters in the second pressure Erdoğan's campaign in the second round, Kılıçdaroğlu's campaign adopted an nationalistic and discourse to attract and ZP voters and promised to return Syrian refugees to their home country. This appeal to the nationalists have worked against both the Kurdish voters and his CHP supporters to not vote in the second of voting behaviour in Turkey are on based on and economic voting to Turkish politics, which is by a dominant and that controls a and state The comprising mainly and is and the In the Republican the is by and a nationalist The is a that the efforts and and ethnic with and The bases of the are to into an after the AKP's of the state and of this in voting behaviour is found in with a pro-Islamist conservative amongst relatively in the of large metropolitan cities and who to support the right-of-centre pro-Islamist and nationalist The central constituencies have relatively higher and values A significant of economic evaluations has also been with and the use of misinformation in and social media is with for vote choices and the democratic in the country over more than a during Erdoğan's presidential vote are also to not only on evaluations of performance in different policy areas but also on the overall satisfaction with the Turkish democracy an into Erdoğan was to secure a winning I on a and a post-election One that from these data is that performance evaluations across 15 issue areas a issues are considered when not based on the of LGBTQ and Kurdish issues is relatively low. and economic welfare are closely by national Despite on conservative and nationalist issues such as the use of turban and in public spaces, Syrian refugees or moral values these are of The of issues increases from to as the campaign but back to the initial as the public in The performance evaluations of Erdoğan's are The first together issues that favour the which has relatively higher evaluations compared to the second which together issues the opposition with a relatively performance This is strongly with foreign policy and as well as conservative like the turban issue and the of moral LGBTQ and Kurdish issues, which have the and economic issues such as the of economic welfare and bringing which have amongst the performance all in the second suggesting that this is the that together issues that favour the These evaluations also a with AKP voters significantly higher The performance are higher for the first for both the AKP and CHP the AKP, the the two is than for the CHP. and of economic evaluations for the and be used to economic voting a prospective evaluations of or pocketbook are more during the 2023 campaign from to May 2023 and during the post-election in Turkey than retrospective (see also 2024). The retrospective evaluations negative and evaluations from to but significantly in the post-election AKP supporters are more and CHP supporters are more than the overall In the of performance evaluations gave Erdoğan a chance to his losses in one of issues, the Syrian Kurdish and issues, with in relatively evaluations in foreign national security and conservative issues such as the turban use in public These performance evaluations also a deep providing an to the in Erdoğan's favour via evaluations also a and to be relatively which provides more for reducing the negative influence of retrospective on the the two candidates in the second round of the May 2023 presidential election, who Erdoğan's voters is no the two but age was a significant in the election, with relatively voters to vote for high and level is already these voters are relatively low voters who are high and are significantly more to vote for the opposition candidate, In to in or in different from of the metropolitan centres. and ethnic of and Kurds are than the Turkish to vote for As the of the the to vote for Erdoğan also to the end of the are significantly more to vote for the prospective pocketbook some amongst the economic As prospective evaluations of the the of voting for Erdoğan the performance of the Erdoğan on the economic before the elections, this finding his electoral Erdoğan's to the economic of the by the wage and providing early retirement to a significant group of to have the damaging influence of retrospective the appeal of the promises for the which relatively more prospective appears to his the two performance the first those issue areas with that favour the the of voting for The of this impact is the largest amongst all Erdoğan's on foreign and security policies and issues for the conservative constituencies gave his campaign an over evaluations in the second which is over different issues not to have affected the vote towards Erdoğan the misinformation claim that opposition alliance the the claim that opposition alliance has entered into with a terrorist who are more with the the Turkish democracy to to vote for the Kılıçdaroğlu voters are more to be amongst the relatively This finding is in with an by that Turkish voters who are on the winning and to in the performance of the country's polarization in the evaluations of the of the political Although the overall level of satisfaction with democracy does not to be high or the of the the in these evaluations attract those who are to vote for in shaping vote opposition party and The expectation of improved performance evaluations in these areas may have Erdoğan's focus on security and foreign policy. The performance foreign policy and security as well as other issues for conservative have a significant impact on the to Erdoğan over that the vote voters who not have a high or higher are more to vote for Kurdish and sectarian of were both negatively predisposed to vote for After controlling for and no of areas or the of metropolitan Erdoğan's vote from right-of-centre voters who high democratic has over the Erdoğan appears to attract voters who are with the Turkish regime of Erdoğan voters are more and Kılıçdaroğlu voters are The misinformation campaign claims the opposition with a organization or supporting the LGBTQ agenda did not have a significant impact on the vote Erdoğan and were not due to issues on the LGBTQ demands, Syrian refugees or the of against as to in economic policy. The the issues the of the Kurdish problem, or the the and more in determining the vote Erdoğan and the presidential system in Turkey was by the those who favoured it The opposition on the issue of the presidential system and its for all However, the of the May 2023 elections it that Turkey to a parliamentary system Erdoğan his is that these elections were but not The of and on democratic and the rule of law are to the the opposition on the and Erdoğan on the winning for campaign on the country's agenda. However, the factors the Erdoğan vote remained Erdoğan relied on his conservative constituencies with low-educated performance in of issues conservative security and foreign policy helped him The election's had for Turkey's democratic and foreign policy Erdoğan adopt a rational economic policy to economic with and growth before the elections. to his due to political like the Istanbul and could his leading to more in economic and other policy areas to opposition these policy areas, security and foreign policy are to occupy an space due to his already credibility and success in the face of his conservative his victory and the resulting over all Erdoğan is to of his and new foreign policy right-wing in is also to more to the other as Turkey's democratic to which is for Erdoğan, who on his conservative to control of the Turkish Grand National in a of the status and continued on the a new electoral of to Erdoğan's is that this from the of and election a new of with the Erdoğan democratic the opposition leadership does not to their for democratic are

Development economics · Economics · Political science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Populism, Right-Wing Movements · Turkey's Politics and Society

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