Independent Fiscal Councils
Neglected Siblings of Independent Central Banks? An EU Perspective
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6282604 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Martin Larch (0000-0002-2327-1490, European Commission, corresponding author), Thomas Braendle (Swiss Federal Department of Finance University of Basel) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 267-283 |
| Publication date | 2018-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0021-9886 • E-ISSN: 1468-5965 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/jcms.12577 |
| OpenAlex | W2733465316 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 32 |
Governance of monetary and fiscal policy have followed diverging paths. Since the late 1980s monetary policy has been delegated to independent central banks. By contrast, fiscal stabilization remained in political hands but has progressively been constrained by rules; the Stability and Growth Pact in the EU is a prominent case in point. While delegation and independence eliminated the inflation bias, fiscal policy still suffers from a deficit bias as enforcement of rules remains difficult. A logical extension of all attempts to progressively tie the hands of politics would be to carve out the stabilization function from the broader field of fiscal policy and to delegate it to national independent fiscal councils. Apart from addressing the political economy behind the deficit bias, such a step would facilitate a better co‐ordination of macroeconomic policies in Economic and Monetary Union
Corporate governance · Delegate · Delegation · Economic policy · Economics · Enforcement · European union · Fiscal policy · Fiscal union · Independence (probability theory · Inflation (cosmology · International economics · Macroeconomics · Member states · Monetary economics · Monetary policy · Political science · Politics · Price of stability · Stability and Growth Pact · European Monetary and Fiscal Policies · Finance · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Law
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| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,14 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2025 (7) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |