The Troika is Dead, Long Live the Domestic Troikas
The Diffusion of National Fiscal Councils in the European Union
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7876901 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tobias Tesche (0000-0003-2213-7051, Department of Social and Political Sciences European University Institute San Domenico di Fiesole, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 1211-1227 |
| Publication date | 2019-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0021-9886 • E-ISSN: 1468-5965 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/jcms.12880 |
| OpenAlex | W2946648147 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 43 |
This article shows that the troika institutions – the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund – formed a technocratic consensus about the desirability of establishing national fiscal councils in the European Union (EU). Considerable disagreement existed, however, with regard to their design features. Each institution promoted a distinct mode of indirect governance by ranking national fiscal councils depending on their adopted governance model (agent, trustee or orchestrator). This persuasion, through entrepreneurial benchmarking, constitutes an important mechanism by which member states were nudged to adopt a distinct fiscal council model. Preference heterogeneity among the troika members ultimately prevented the spread of a one‐size‐fits‐all fiscal council in the EU
Corporate governance · Economic governance · Economics · European commission · European union · Fiscal policy · Fiscal union · Institution · International economics · Macroeconomics · Member states · Political science · Politics · Stability and Growth Pact · Technocracy · European Monetary and Fiscal Policies · Finance · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration
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| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,43 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2024 (6) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |