Does Banking Union Worsen theEU's Democratic Deficit? The Need for Greater Supervisory Data Transparency
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283140 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christopher Gandrud (0000-0003-4723-7585, Hertie School of Governance), Mark Hallerberg (0000-0002-4617-9929, Hertie School of Governance) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 769-785 |
| Publication date | 2015-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0021-9886 • E-ISSN: 1468-5965 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/jcms.12226 |
| OpenAlex | W1924898583 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 28 |
Does banking union exacerbate the European Union's democratic deficit? Using Scharpf's ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy concepts, it is argued in this article that its design does worsen the democratic deficit. There are good reasons to limit ‘input legitimacy’ for politically independent institutions. ‘Output legitimacy’ is then even more relevant. Transparency is a key part of ‘output legitimacy’. It enables actors to judge whether the regulator is acting in the public's interest and can improve their outputs. This article focuses on the banking data that the supervisors collect. Data available to the European public is evaluated and compared toAmerica's banking union. European practices are not comparable in terms of availability or detail. An original survey of relevant officials is conducted, which results in the finding that only 11 of 28 Member States release any information on the banks they supervise. BothEUand national supervisors should provide publicly available, timely and consistent individual bank data
Accountability · Business · Democracy · democratic deficit · Democratic legitimacy · Economic policy · Economics · European union · Legitimacy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Transparency (behavior · Accounting · European Union Policy and Governance · Global Financial Regulation and Crises · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration
The European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court
Introduction to the special issue
The ECB as a banking supervisor
Explaining variation and change in supervisory confidentiality in the European Union
Contesting the European Central Bank in Banking Supervision
Information and financial crisis policy-making
Financial Data Transparency, International Institutions, and Sovereign Borrowing Costs
Democracy in Europe
The Bankers’ New Clothes
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Learning From Oversight
Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU
Rules Rather than Discretion
Interpersonal trust, political trust and non‐institutionalised political participation in Western Europe
Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited
Democracy in the age of the euro
The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems
The Institutional Design of EMU
The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation
European Deposit Insurance and Resolution in the Banking Union
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,78 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2023 (7) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |