Explaining variation and change in supervisory confidentiality in the European Union
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8041791 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christopher Gandrud (0000-0003-4723-7585, IQSS, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA), Mark Hallerberg (0000-0002-4617-9929, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, Germany, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 41 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1025-1048 |
| Publication date | 2017-11-06 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | West European Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0140-2382 • E-ISSN: 1743-9655 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/01402382.2017.1389421 |
| OpenAlex | W2767785092 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 20 |
Some European Union member states' financial regulators choose to make some of the data they routinely collect on individual banks publicly available. Others treat this data as confidential. What explains this difference? This paper considers the possible effects of crises, path-dependent legal institutions, and the design of deposit insurance schemes. At the national level, the paper focuses on contrasting German and Dutch cases. After the recent economic crisis, the Dutch released more data while the German authorities maintained strict confidentiality rules. The design of deposit insurance schemes provides a key reason why the level of secrecy varies, with the Dutch move from an ex post to an ex ante scheme where the government served as the ultimate backstop leading to questions about the accounts of individual banks while the German system favoured continued secrecy. The paper also describes the level of transparency at the EU level. Multilevel legal restrictions and bureaucratic capacity tilt EU banking union practices towards member states that treat financial supervisory data as confidential
Banking Union · Bureaucracy · Business · Confidentiality · Economic policy · Economics · European union · German · Government (linguistics · Negotiation · Political science · Secrecy · Transparency (behavior · Accounting · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Credit Risk and Financial Regulations · Global Financial Regulation and Crises · Law
Systemic Banking Crises Database
Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy
The diffusion of financial supervisory governance ideas
Domestic preferences and European banking supervision
The political dynamics behind Europe’s new banking union
Explaining the Reform of Banking Supervision in Europe
Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research
Does Banking Union Worsen theEU's Democratic Deficit? The Need for Greater Supervisory Data Transparency
Overseeing Secrets in the EU
Democratic Secrecy
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,25 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2021 (4) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |