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Choice of Partners in Multiple Two-Person Prisoner's Dilemma Games

An Experimental Study

Bibliographic Data

ID6283429
AuthorsEsther Hauk (0000-0002-3089-9307, Universitat Pompeu Fabra), Rosemarie Nagel (0000-0001-6599-0664, Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Year2001
Volume45
Issue6
Pages770-793
Publication date2001-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002701045006004
OpenAlexW2784349889
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited21

The effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas is examined. Participants played simultaneously several finitely repeated, two-person prisoner's dilemma games. Results show that unilateral choice leads to lower defection and fewer exits than mutual choice. In the unilateral-choice setup, intending defectors are more likely to exit than intending cooperators. Implications of these findings in the political context are discussed

Context (archaeology · Dilemma · Economics · Game theory · Microeconomics · Prisoner's dilemma · Selection (genetic algorithm · Superrationality · Computer Science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology

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Unique citing works7
Citations per year0,3
Citation span2003 - 2017 (15)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 7

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