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Mechanisms for Efficient Voting with Private Information about Preferences

Bibliographic Data

ID9718079
AuthorsDirk Engelmann (University of Mannheim, University of Copenhagen, Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic and CESifo), Veronika Grimm (0000-0002-9759-4807, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg)
Year2012
Volume122
Issue563
Pages1010-1041
Publication date2012-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02515.x
OpenAlexW2160935864
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited16

Journal Article Mechanisms for Efficient Voting with Private Information about Preferences Get access Dirk Engelmann, Dirk Engelmann University of Mannheim, University of Copenhagen, Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic and CESifo Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Veronika Grimm Veronika Grimm University of Erlangen‐Nuremberg Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 122, Issue 563, September 2012, Pages 1010–1041, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02515.x Published: 12 March 2012 Article history Received: 22 March 2011 Accepted: 30 October 2011 Published: 12 March 2012

Computer security · Conflict resolution · Economics · Incentive · Matching (statistics · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Political science · Politics · Private information retrieval · Representation (politics · Simple (philosophy · Voting · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Law

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Unique citing works3
Citations per year0,21
Citation span2012 - 2014 (3)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 3

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