Which Way to Cooperate
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9710979 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Todd R Kaplan (0000-0001-5307-743X, University of Exeter and University of Haifa Ben‐Gurion University), Bradley J Ruffle (0000-0002-7122-9414, University of Exeter and University of Haifa Ben‐Gurion University) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 122 |
| Issue | 563 |
| Pages | 1042-1068 |
| Publication date | 2012-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02485.x |
| OpenAlex | W3023076291 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 25 |
Cooperation in real-world dilemmas takes many forms. We introduce a class of two-player games that permits two distinct ways to cooperate in the repeated game. One way to cooperate is to play cutoff strategies, which rely solely on a player’s private value to defection. The second cooperative strategy is to take turns, which relies on publicly available information. Our initial experiments reveal that almost all cooperators adopt cutoff strategies. However, follow-up experiments in which the distribution of values to defection are made more similar show that all cooperators now take turns. Our results offer insight into what form a cooperative norm will take: for mundane tasks or where individuals otherwise have similar payoffs, taking turns is likely; for difficult tasks that differentiate individuals by skill or by preferences, cutoff cooperation will emerge
Cheap talk · Computer security · Economics · Incentive · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Private information retrieval · Repetition (rhetorical device · Statistics · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics
Experimental Economics
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Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data
Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Z-Tree
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From weakest-link to best-shot
An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods
Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Mechanisms for Efficient Voting with Private Information about Preferences
Collusion and Equilibrium Selection in Auctions
The Minimal Contributing Set as a Solution to Public Goods Problems
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,07 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2012 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |